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The Controversial Demise of Zauderer: 
Revitalizing Zauderer Post-NIFLA 
Aaron Stenz 
  INTRODUCTION   
All too often, the law is arcane, confusing, and fundamen-
tally divorced from the day-to-day lives of average Americans. 
Few, if any, average Americans have a tangible reason to care 
about something as deeply separated from their lives as standing 
doctrine.1 Even some aspects of the Bill of Rights likely fall be-
yond the scope of what the average American cares about on a 
day-to-day basis.2 However, every American has seen a bill-
board, watched a commercial on TV, or endured a pop-up adver-
tisement online.3 Nearly every American has bought something 
or paid for a service.4 And it is here that the divide between the 
law and daily life is closed.  
 
  J.D. Candidate 2020, University of Minnesota Law School. Thanks to 
Professor Heidi Kitrosser for her expertise and thoughtful comments through-
out this process. Thanks also to the editors and staff members of Minnesota Law 
Review for their work on this Note and all of Volume 104, with special thanks 
to Frances Fink, David Hahn, Jack Davis, and Sam Cleveland for editorial con-
tributions. Copyright © 2019 by Aaron Z. Stenz. 
 1. Standing essentially involves a requirement that a party must have suf-
fered an actual injury to a protected interest. Standing, BLACK’S LAW DICTION-
ARY (11th ed. 2019).  
 2. For instance, consider the doctrine of incitement under the First 
Amendment. See generally Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 449 (1969) (de-
scribing the incitement exception to First Amendment protections). Unless 
someone is considering egging another on to do some illegal activity, they likely 
have little interest in the legal doctrine surrounding incitement. See id.  
 3. See Louise Story, Anywhere the Eye Can See, It’s Likely to See an Ad, 
N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 15, 2007), https://www.nytimes.com/2007/01/15/business/ 
media/15everywhere.html [https://perma.cc/6SBG-CDU8] (noting that consum-
ers see thousands of advertisements and brand messages every day). 
 4. See BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, USDL-18-
1450, CONSUMER EXPENDITURES–2017, at 1 (2017) (defining “consumer units” 
as “families, single persons living alone or sharing a household with others but 
who are financially independent, or two or more persons living together who 
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For the most part, Americans choose which products or ser-
vices they use by evaluating the information available to them.5 
Indeed, there is an industry dedicated to this very idea: websites 
and magazines provide consumers with the facts they need in 
order to make an informed decision.6 While much of this infor-
mation is readily available, either from the advertiser or seller 
itself or third parties such as Yelp, sometimes the law steps in. 
Despite its normal role as a restriction on government power and 
excess, the First Amendment allows the government to compel 
commercial speakers—anyone advertising or proposing a com-
mercial transaction for profit—to provide consumers with addi-
tional information, especially when the commercial speaker may 
be hesitant to disclose such information to consumers.7 In fact, 
most consumers have likely seen information from some such 
disclosure requirement, on anything ranging from lawyer fee ar-
rangements to country-of-origin labels on meat packages.8 Given 
the prominence of commercial disclosure laws and the im-
portance of information to making informed commercial deci-
sions, consumers should pay close attention to developments in 
the law which may limit their access to information. 
In National Institute of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra 
(NIFLA), the Supreme Court fundamentally shifted how com-
mercial disclosures are treated. In NIFLA, the Court struck 
down a California law requiring crisis pregnancy centers to dis-
play notices regarding the availability of state facilities that pro-
vided abortions and other family planning services.9 Prior prec-
edent allowed for governments to compel commercial actors to 
disclose “purely factual and uncontroversial” information.10 The 
NIFLA majority, however, determined that the notice required 
 
share major expenses” and detailing the ubiquity of spending among consumer 
units). 
 5. See Peter Dizikes, How Do We Decide Which Products To Buy?, WORLD 
ECON. F. (Apr. 2, 2015), https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2015/04/how-do-we 
-decide-which-products-buy/ [https://perma.cc/9Y7C-V8PB] (providing research 
on consumer purchasing trends and decisions).  
 6. See, e.g., CONSUMER REP. (Mar. 21, 2019) https://www.consumerreports 
.org/cro/index.htm [https://perma.cc/9KA4-H45B]; YELP, https://www.yelp.com/  
[https://perma.cc/W73Y-WA5J]. 
 7. See infra Part I.C.  
 8. See infra Part I.C.  
 9. Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra (NIFLA), 138 S. Ct. 
2361, 2368–78 (2018).  
 10. See Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 651 (1985). 
  
2019] THE DEMISE OF ZAUDERER 555 
 
by California law was not sufficiently factual and uncontrover-
sial to fit within this precedent because abortion is “anything but 
an ‘uncontroversial’ topic.”11 While other courts implementing 
the “purely factual and uncontroversial” standard relied only on 
the veracity of the information in determining whether a com-
pelled disclosure was constitutional,12 the NIFLA majority took 
a markedly different approach by holding that even indisputably 
factual disclosures could fall outside the standard if the under-
lying topic is controversial.13 In effect, NIFLA fundamentally re-
shapes the law governing the flow of information to consumers 
in the form of compelled commercial disclosures in a concerning 
way.  
While others have already flagged deeply problematic as-
pects of NIFLA,14 this Note focuses on the case’s engagement 
with the “purely factual and uncontroversial” standard. Part I 
briefly explains compelled and commercial speech doctrines and 
surveys the nexus of the two: the doctrine of compelled factual 
disclosures in commercial speech contexts. Part I also explores 
the importance of commercial disclosure requirements and why 
they are worth protecting, as well as summarizing the road to 
NIFLA. Part II examines the “purely factual and uncontrover-
sial” standard initially established in Zauderer v. Office of Disci-
plinary Counsel (Zauderer) as a confusing and problematic doc-
trine, particularly following its implementation in NIFLA.15 In 
Part II, this Note argues that the “purely factual and uncontro-
versial” standard requires reconsideration and revision because: 
(1) the standard is (and has been since its inception) unclear and 
confusing; (2) the post-NIFLA version of the standard subjects 
commercial disclosure requirements to an impermissible poten-
tial for judicial bias; and (3) the standard as implemented in NI-
FLA separates the current doctrine from the consumer protec-
tion interests that it is supposed to serve.16 Part III builds upon 
the discussion in Part II by proposing that wiping the Zauderer 
slate clean and returning to the “unduly burdensome” test that 
Zauderer espoused is the best way to address the problems 
raised in Part II because the “unduly burdensome” test is far 
 
 11. NIFLA, 138 S. Ct. at 2372.  
 12. See infra Part I.C.3.  
 13. See NIFLA, 138 S. Ct. at 2372. 
 14. See id. at 2380–83 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (criticizing the majority’s 
characterization of the regulation at issue as content-based).  
 15. See Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 651. 
 16. See id. 
  
556 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [104:553 
 
more clear, less prone to judicial bias, and better serves the con-
sumer protection interests that underlie commercial speech doc-
trine.17 Ultimately, this Note shows that the NIFLA holding’s 
implementation of the “purely factual and uncontroversial” 
standard requires stringent reevaluation going forward. 
I.  COMMERCIAL SPEECH, COMPELLED SPEECH, AND 
COMPELLED FACTUAL DISCLOSURES IN COMMERCIAL 
SPEECH   
Although the First Amendment’s general protection of 
speech is foundational to American democracy and has been vig-
orously defended in the courts, not all speech receives the same 
level of protection. Cases involving First Amendment protections 
of speech generally involve two distinct determinations: (1) what 
the relevant test or standard is based on the facts at hand; and 
(2) determining the outcome of applying the standard.18 Typi-
cally, restrictions on or regulations of speech based on content 
are subject to strict scrutiny, a rigorous review that reflects a 
high degree of skepticism with regard to government justifica-
tions and regulation of speech.19 However, in certain contexts, 
the bar which the government must clear in order to constitu-
tionally regulate speech is lowered, with courts being more re-
ceptive and less skeptical of government justifications and ra-
tionales and less concerned about the consequences of such 
regulations.20 This Part discusses compelled and commercial 
speech doctrines and the intersection of the two in the form of 
compelled commercial disclosure doctrine, before examining the 
California statute challenged in NIFLA and the NIFLA holding. 
Sections A and B explore the Court’s compelled and commercial 
speech jurisprudences respectively. Section C examines com-
pelled commercial disclosure doctrine as the nexus of compelled 
and commercial speech jurisprudence. Section D sets forth the 
facts and legal outcome of NIFLA.  
A. COMPELLED SPEECH DOCTRINE: PROTECTING THE RIGHT 
NOT TO SPEAK 
“If there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, 
it is that no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be 
 
 17. See infra Part III.  
 18. See, e.g., NIFLA, 138 S. Ct. at 2371–78.  
 19. See id. 
 20. See infra Parts I.B–C. 
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orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of 
opinion or force citizens to confess by word or act their faith 
therein.”21 Justice Jackson’s words in West Virginia State Board 
of Education v. Barnette are the cornerstone upon which the 
Court’s compelled speech jurisprudence is founded. Jackson en-
capsulated the core of compelled speech doctrine in one sentence: 
Speech compelled by the state usually poses a grave constitu-
tional threat and should be viewed with extreme distrust.22 The 
Court expanded on this principle in Wooley v. Maynard, declar-
ing “[t]he right to speak and the right to refrain from speaking 
are complementary components” of the freedom of speech.23  
In summary, two important points deserve emphasis. First, 
the Court’s compelled speech jurisprudence strongly disfavors 
government attempts to compel speech on the basis of its con-
tent.24 Second, although the exact analysis courts have used in 
compelled speech cases has been inconsistent, the general ap-
proach is akin to strict scrutiny.25 For instance, Barnette and Mi-
ami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo—finding unconstitutional 
a West Virginia Board of Education resolution requiring stu-
dents to stand for the Pledge of Allegiance and a Florida statute 
 
 21. W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943). In Bar-
nette, the Supreme Court heard a challenge to a West Virginia Board of Educa-
tion resolution requiring all students and teachers to stand, salute the flag, and 
recite the Pledge of Allegiance. Id. at 626. A group of students expelled from 
school for noncompliance with the resolution due to their religious beliefs as 
Jehovah’s Witnesses challenged that it violated their First and Fourteenth 
Amendment rights. Id. at 629–30. Justice Jackson agreed, penning the now-
famous quote above in his majority opinion. Id. at 642. Interestingly, Barnette 
explicitly overruled the Courts holding in Minersville School District v. Gobitis, 
decided only three years earlier and involving facts virtually identical to those 
in Barnette. Id.; see also Minersville Sch. Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586, 591, 595, 
599–600 (1940) (upholding a requirement that students participate in the 
pledge and relying on the importance of the educational system for inculcating 
values, particularly that of national unity). The Barnette court overruled Gobitis 
by holding that the individual free speech interest in not being compelled to 
speak a message with which one fundamentally disagrees trumped the state 
interest in cultivating values of national unity. Barnette, 319 U.S. at 640–42. 
 22. See Barnette, 319 U.S. at 692.  
 23. Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 707–08, 714–17 (1977).  
 24. See, e.g., Janus v. Am. Fed’n of State, Cty., & Mun. Emps., Council 31, 
138 S. Ct. 2448, 2459 (2018). 
 25. Timothy J. Straub, Fair Warning?: The First Amendment, Compelled 
Commercial Disclosures, and Cigarette Warning Labels, 40 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 
1201, 1206–13 (2013) (detailing the Court’s compelled speech jurisprudence and 
the analysis the Court has undertaken in reaching its conclusions).  
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creating an affirmative duty for newspapers to publish the re-
plies of political candidates criticized by the paper respectively—
appear to have relied only on a presumption against the consti-
tutionality of compelled speech rather than conducting means-
ends analysis.26 In contrast, even though the Court ultimately 
determined that requiring religious individuals to display New 
Hampshire’s “Live Free or Die” motto on their license plates was 
unconstitutional compelled speech, Wooley opened the door to 
upholding laws compelling speech if the state could show a suf-
ficiently compelling interest and employed proportionate and 
least restrictive means to achieve its goal.27 Cases such as Pacific 
Gas & Electric Co. v. Public Utilities Commission, in which the 
Court rejected a California Public Utilities Commission order re-
quiring utility companies to include political messages from 
other speakers in the extra space of their billing envelopes, seem 
to exemplify this trend towards strict scrutiny.28 In conclusion, 
despite minor inconsistencies in approach, compelled speech doc-
trine is unified by a deep distrust of compelled speech require-
ments.  
B. HARDIER SPEECH: WHY COMMERCIAL SPEECH IS LESS 
PROTECTED 
The unifying thread of compelled speech doctrine is that 
compelling speech is presumptively unconstitutional, or at least 
that speakers have a typically insurmountable right under the 
First Amendment both to speak and not to speak.29 In contrast, 
the core of the Supreme Court’s current commercial speech doc-
trine suggests that commercial speech deserves a lesser degree 
of protection than other kinds of speech.30 This Section explores 
the shifts within the Court’s commercial speech doctrine and ex-
plains the current state of the doctrine.  
 
 26. See id. at 1209; see generally Miami Herald Publ’g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 
U.S. 241 (1974) (holding that Florida statute that required newspaper to dedi-
cate space for a political candidate to respond to attacks as an unconstitutional 
infraction upon the freedom of the press and speech); Barnette, 319 U.S. at 624. 
 27. See Wooley, 430 U.S. at 716–17; Straub, supra note 25, at 1209. 
 28. See Straub, supra note 25, at 1212 (noting the Pacific Gas Court’s im-
plementation of strict scrutiny); see also Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Utils. 
Comm’n, 475 U.S. 1, 19 (1986). 
 29. See supra Part I.A. 
 30. See Nicole B. Cásarez, Don’t Tell Me What to Say: Compelled Commer-
cial Speech and the First Amendment, 63 MO. L. REV. 929, 932 (1998).  
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Initially, in Valentine v. Chrestensen, commercial speech 
was treated as commerce rather than speech and thus could be 
regulated in ways that did not need to meet standards for regu-
lation under the First Amendment.31 For instance, because pass-
ing out advertising handbills in the street or using nude dancing 
to promote the sale of alcohol was commercial speech and thus 
not within the purview of the First Amendment, courts were 
much more deferential to their prohibition or regulation by local 
governments.32 In 1976, the Court overruled Valentine and ush-
ered in a new era for commercial speech doctrine.33 In Virginia 
State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 
Inc., the Court heard a challenge to a Virginia statute forbidding 
pharmacists from advertising prescription drug prices.34 Justice 
Blackmun’s majority opinion rejected Valentine’s holding that 
commercial speech was less deserving of First Amendment pro-
tection than other types of speech.35 Justice Blackmun did, how-
ever, explicitly leave open the door to some regulation of com-
mercial speech, saying that “[t]he First Amendment . . . does not 
prohibit the State from insuring that the stream of commercial 
information flow [sic] cleanly as well as freely.”36  
 
 31. See id. at 932–33; see also Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52, 53–
55 (1942), overruled by Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer 
Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976). It is worth noting that the advertisement in 
Valentine did contain non-commercial speech, but the court noted that the dis-
tributor had obviously included that material in a revised version of the adver-
tisement in an attempt to avoid the ordinance rather than actually disseminate 
ideas, and thus upheld the ordinance’s prohibition of the advertisement as 
wholly commercial speech. Id.  
 32. See Valentine, 316 U.S. at 53–55 (upholding an ordinance prohibiting 
the distribution of advertisements in the streets); Hodges v. Fitle, 332 F. Supp. 
504, 509 (D. Neb. 1971) (holding that Valentine’s test should be applied to an 
ordinance prohibiting the use of nude dancing to promote the sale of alcohol). 
 33. See Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 
425 U.S. 748 (1976). The Court defined commercial speech as that “which does 
no more than propose a commercial transaction[.]” Id. at 776 (Stewart, J., con-
curring).  
 34. Id. at 749–50.  
 35. Id. at 770–73 (holding that commercial speech is entitled to protection, 
at least where the state is attempting to suppress the dissemination of “truthful 
information about entirely lawful activity”).  
 36. Id. at 771–72. The Court distinguished the facts in the case from other 
potential scenarios, suggesting states would have the authority to regulate com-
mercial speech where the speech is false, deceptive, or misleading, or where the 
speech advocates for illegal conduct. Id. at 770–73. 
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In determining that commercial speech deserves protection, 
albeit less protection than other forms of protected speech, the 
Court pointed to “commonsense differences” between commer-
cial and other kinds of speech for justification.37 First, the Court 
suggested that commercial speakers are in a unique position 
which allows them to verify the content of their speech.38 Second, 
the Court asserted that commercial speech is more “durable” 
than other types of protected speech and is thus less easily dis-
couraged or chilled by regulation.39  
Underlying this shift in doctrine from Valentine to Virginia 
State Board of Pharmacy was an implicit recognition that com-
mercial speech should be afforded First Amendment protection 
because of the vital role it plays in informing and protecting con-
sumers. Justice Blackmun’s opinion hinted at this recognition by 
justifying the decision in part on the public’s interest in the free 
flow of commercial information in order to allow consumers to 
make the best decisions for themselves.40 The examples 
Blackmun suggested as instances where the state could permis-
sibly curtail commercial speech—namely commercial speech 
that is untruthful, misleading, or proposes illegal transactions—
further hint at this recognition: untruthful or misleading speech 
prevents consumers from exercising informed judgment, while 
proposing illegal transactions may jeopardize the freedom of an 
ignorant but participating consumer.41 Decreasing the broad 
ability of the state to regulate what and when commercial infor-
mation flows to consumers as a means of better aiding consum-
ers may seem counterintuitive—many average Americans would 
likely rejoice at the prospect of their lives being less inundated 
with advertisements.42 However, decreasing the latitude for gov-
ernment regulation as a means of serving consumers is justified 
 
 37. Id. at 771 n.24.  
 38. Id. at 777 (Stewart, J., concurring). The Court assumed that since ad-
vertisers have a unique knowledge of and ability to access their own products, 
they are well situated to check the veracity of their claims. Id. 
 39. This rationale assumes that since commercial speakers must advertise 
in order to sell their products, they are less likely to be dissuaded from speaking 
in the face of regulation. Id. at 772 n.24. 
 40. Id. at 763–65. 
 41. See id. at 771–72. 
 42. See Christopher Elliott, Yes, There Are Too Many Ads Online. Yes, You 
Can Stop Them. Here’s How., HUFFPOST (Feb. 09, 2017), https://www.huffpost 
.com/entry/yes-there-are-too-many-ads-online-yes-you-canstop_b_589b888de 
4b02bbb1816c297 [https://perma.cc/MG6V-D46K] (providing resources to com-
bat against unwanted advertisements).  
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by considering two very important theoretical points: (1) there is 
a fundamental and justified concern at the very core of First 
Amendment protections for speech that the government, no mat-
ter how good its intentions, may be too heavy-handed in curtail-
ing in speech;43 and (2) relying on the state to determine what 
information is good for its citizens reeks of the paternalism that 
has been viewed as disturbing since Plato’s Republic and that 
has ultimately largely been rejected in the First Amendment 
context.44 Ultimately, this recognition that protecting and in-
forming consumers should be the primary justification for pro-
tecting commercial speech serves as the foundation for today’s 
commercial speech doctrine. 
In 1980, the Court modified its approach to commercial 
speech again, but built on the same conception of commercial 
speech as valuable primarily for its role in informing and pro-
tecting consumers.45 In Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corpora-
tion v. Public Service Commission of New York, the Court both 
extended the lesser degree of protection mentioned in Virginia 
State Board of Pharmacy and implemented a new four-part test 
to determine the constitutionality of advertising restrictions.46 
Central Hudson involved a challenge to an order from the New 
York utilities commission to utilities in the state to refrain from 
promotional advertising in an attempt to reduce power usage 
 
 43. See, e.g., Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989) (striking down a law 
against flag-burning despite the government’s justifications regarding protect-
ing the flag’s inherent symbolic value because the law trenched too broadly on 
freedoms of expression). 
 44. See infra note 45 and accompanying text. See generally PLATO, REPUB-
LIC 170–73 (C.D.C. Reeve trans., Hackett Publ’g Co. 2004) (c. 380 B.C.E.). 
 45. See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 
557, 561–64 (1980) (noting that commercial speech’s value is created by its abil-
ity to, but also limited by the extent to which it can, inform consumers). Some 
have suggested that Central Hudson and the shift in doctrine it created came 
as the result of an attempt to balance the competing concerns of paternalism 
and consumer protection. See Cásarez, supra note 30, at 935–36. Indeed, the 
Central Hudson opinion directly addresses this dichotomy by heavily emphasiz-
ing the value of commercial speech as arising from its informative value to con-
sumers while simultaneously dismissing a paternalistic approach. See Cent. 
Hudson, 447 U.S. at 561–62. Two cases preceding Central Hudson generally 
represent these concerns as deployed by the Court. See Ohralik v. Ohio State 
Bar Ass’n, 436 U.S. 447 (1978) (upholding a state bar regulation prohibiting in-
person self-promotion and solicitation by lawyers on consumer protection 
grounds); Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350 (1977) (using anti-paternal-
istic arguments to justify holding that attorneys have the right to advertise 
their services and prices under the First Amendment).  
 46. See Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 562–63, 566.  
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during the energy crisis of the mid-1970’s.47 The Court defined 
commercial speech as “expression related solely to the economic 
interests of the speaker and its audience” before implementing 
the new four-part test.48  
The Central Hudson test requires courts to consider four fac-
tors in assessing the constitutionality of restrictions on commer-
cial speech. First, a court must consider whether the expression 
in question falls within the purview of First Amendment protec-
tion, which requires that it “at least must concern lawful activity 
and not be misleading.”49 Second, the court considers whether 
the asserted government interest is substantial.50 If the court 
decides in the affirmative with respect to both of these factors, it 
then considers “whether the regulation directly advances the 
governmental interest asserted” and “whether it is not more ex-
tensive than is necessary to serve that interest.”51 While the or-
der in question in Central Hudson satisfied the first three fac-
tors, the Court held that it was an impermissible infringement 
on protected speech due to overbreadth under the fourth factor.52  
In sum, whereas the courts have vigorously defended the 
right not to speak as fully protected by the First Amendment,53 
courts have given commercial speech less protection because it 
is more “durable” or “hardy.”54 The protection that is extended to 
commercial speech is justified by commercial speech’s value in 
informing and protecting consumers.55 The constitutionality of 
restrictions on commercial speech is assessed by using the four-
factor Central Hudson test.56 Although the test has been inter-
preted quite deferentially to state interests and justifications in 
 
 47. Id. at 558–59; see also Cásarez, supra note 30, at 936–37.  
 48. Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 561. 
 49. Id. at 566. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id.  
 52. Id. at 569–70 (holding that although the state’s interest was substan-
tial, the order in question would have also applied to advertisements advocating 
reduced energy usage, and thus was too broad to effectively accomplish the 
state’s interest).  
 53. See supra Part I.A. 
 54. See Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 
425 U.S. 748, 772 n.24 (1976); see also Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 564 n.6. 
 55. See supra notes 40–41 and accompanying text.  
 56. The standard of review in these commercial speech cases is generally 
considered to be intermediate scrutiny. See Allen Rostron, Pragmatism, Pater-
nalism, and the Constitutional Protection of Commercial Speech, 37 VT. L. REV. 
527, 530 (2013). 
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the past,57 more recently the Supreme Court has been less def-
erential, instead implementing the test in a way which poten-
tially expands protections for commercial speech and views pa-
ternalistic state interests with greater skepticism.58  
C. ZAUDERER AND BEYOND: COMPELLED FACTUAL 
DISCLOSURES BY COMMERCIAL SPEAKERS 
The Supreme Court’s compelled commercial disclosure doc-
trine, initially implemented in Zauderer,59 represents the conflu-
ence of the compelled and commercial speech doctrines discussed 
in Sections A and B. This Section outlines the importance of com-
pelled commercial disclosures and examines Zauderer in detail 
as the foundational case for compelled factual disclosures before 
exploring other pre-NIFLA implementations of the Zauderer 
standard.  
1. Compelled Commercial Disclosures: A Conceptual 
Background 
Commercial disclosure requirements are justified by the 
idea that consumers will be able to make better decisions when 
purchasing products and services if they have more infor-
mation.60 This reasoning mirrors Justice Blackmun’s reasoning 
in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy that curtailments on com-
mercial speech deprive consumers of information necessary to 
make informed commercial decisions.61 Because sellers have 
 
 57. See, e.g., Posadas de P.R. Assocs. v. Tourism Co. of P.R., 478 U.S. 328, 
332, 340–46 (1986), abrogated by 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 
484 (1996). 
 58. See, e.g., City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 
417–28 (1993). 
 59. 471 U.S. 626 (1985). 
 60. See Nat’1 Elec. Mfrs. Ass’n v. Sorrell, 272 F.3d 104, 113–14 (2d Cir. 
2001). The court stated:  
[M]andated disclosure of accurate, factual, commercial information 
does not offend the core First Amendment values of promoting efficient 
exchange of information or protecting individual liberty interests. Such 
disclosure furthers, rather than hinders, the First Amendment goal of 
the discovery of truth and contributes to the efficiency of the “market-
place of ideas.” Protection of the robust and free flow of accurate infor-
mation is the principal First Amendment justification for protecting 
commercial speech, and requiring disclosure of truthful information 
promotes that goal. 
Id. (citation omitted).  
 61. See supra notes 33–41.  
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more knowledge about their wares than consumers, and that in-
formation would aid consumers in making informed decisions, 
governments have a strong interest in maintaining the market-
place of ideas and requiring sellers to disclose that information, 
particularly when the speech is misleading.62 Commercial disclo-
sure requirements serve important purposes, both for the gov-
ernment and consumers.  
Commercial disclosure requirements inform consumers 
about products and services they use daily. They inform consum-
ers of toxic substances in their products.63 They protect from un-
disclosed costs,64 identify the origins of our food,65 disclose 
whether minerals are conflict free,66 inform of calorie amounts 
at restaurants,67 and generally serve the interests of consumers 
in a myriad of other fashions. They provide information that con-
sumers are deeply interested in: what consumer wants to buy a 
potentially toxic light bulb?68 Thus, in situations like these, the 
scales become tipped against the fundamental right to not speak 
described above: although all of the commercial speakers de-
scribed in this paragraph likely had some interest in nondisclo-
sure—such as lower costs or avoiding reduced interest in their 
product—the interest of consumers in making informed deci-
sions about their purchases simply outweighs that of commercial 
speakers. While not all of these requirements passed judicial 
 
 62. See Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 
425 U.S. 748, 765 (1976) (describing public access to information regarding 
products and services in a free enterprise economy as “indispensable”); see also 
id. at 777 (Stewart, J., concurring) (assuming that since advertisers have 
unique knowledge of their own products, they are well situated to check the 
veracity of their claims). Zauderer also notes that sellers have a minimal inter-
est in not providing such factual information. 471 U.S. 626, 651 (1985). Courts 
have recognized maintaining the marketplace of ideas as important. See Nat’l 
Elec., 272 F.3d at 113–14; see generally JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY (Gerald 
Dworkin ed., Rowan & Littlefield Publishers, Inc. 1997) (1859) (setting forth 
Mill’s conception of the “marketplace of ideas”). 
 63. See Nat’l Elec., 272 F.3d at 107; see also Robin A. Bernhoft, Mercury 
Toxicity and Treatment: A Review of the Literature, 2012 J. ENVTL. & PUB. 
HEALTH 1 (2012). 
 64. See Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 636, 650–53. 
 65. See Am. Meat Inst. v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric. (AMI), 760 F.3d 18, 20 (D.C. 
Cir. 2014) (en banc). 
 66. See Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs. v. SEC, 748 F.3d 359, 363 (D.C. Cir. 2014), over-
ruled by AMI, 760 F.3d at 18.  
 67. See N.Y. State Rest. Ass’n v. N.Y.C. Bd. of Health, No. 08 Civ. 
1000(RJH), 2008 WL 1752455, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 16, 2008). 
 68. See, e.g., Nat’l Elec., 272 F.3d at 107.  
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muster, they collectively demonstrate the importance of com-
mercial disclosure requirements as a means of informing, and 
thus to some extent protecting, consumers.69  
2. Zauderer: The Origin of Lesser Protections for Compelled 
Commercial Disclosures 
In Zauderer, the Supreme Court heard a challenge to three 
Ohio state rules regulating the content of attorneys’ advertise-
ments.70 An Ohio attorney ran several advertisements: one ad-
vertising that the attorney would represent drunk driving de-
fendants and refund all legal fees if they were convicted, and one 
advertising counsel in the Dalkon Shield litigation on a contin-
gent fee basis, with no “legal fees” unless they recovered.71 The 
Ohio Office of Disciplinary Counsel argued that the advertise-
ments were misleading and violated Ohio professional responsi-
bility rules regarding contingent fees.72 The rules in question 
generally prohibited certain types of advertisements deemed 
misleading or otherwise problematic.73 In analyzing the first two 
rules, the Supreme Court applied the Central Hudson test.74 The 
Court’s analysis of the third rule, however, which required attor-
neys advertising contingency fee rates to disclose whether cli-
ents would still owe costs and other expenses for ultimately un-
successful claims, is far more interesting.75  
 
 69. See Leading Cases: Constitutional Law, National Institute of Family & 
Life Advocates v. Becerra, 132 HARV. L. REV. 347, 354 (2018) [hereinafter Lead-
ing Cases: NIFLA] for additional examples of other commercial disclosure re-
quirements; see also NIFLA, 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2380–81 (2018) (Breyer, J., dis-
senting). 
 70. Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 629–36 (1985). 
The plaintiff, a lawyer whose advertisements had been deemed illegal under 
several different rules, challenged three separate rules. Id. Two of these rules 
restricted the content of advertisements by lawyers, while the third rule re-
quired advertisements including contingency rates to disclose whether potential 
clients would remain liable for the costs and expenses of unsuccessful claims. 
Id. at 636.  
 71. Id. at 626.  
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. 
 74. See id. at 641, 647–48. One rule was a ban on self-recommendation and 
unsolicited legal advice, while the other was a ban on the use of illustrations in 
advertising. Id. at 639–41, 647–48.  
 75. See id. at 636, 650–53. 
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With respect to the third rule, the Court rejected the plain-
tiff’s contention that the state would need to show that his ad-
vertisements were false or deceptive regarding potential costs or 
that the rule served some substantial state interest other than 
deception.76 Instead, the Court pointed to fundamental differ-
ences between the compelled factual disclosure at issue and com-
pelled speech jurisprudence generally, declaring that the rule 
only prescribed “what shall be orthodox in commercial advertis-
ing” and that it took “the form of a requirement that appellant 
include in his advertising purely factual and uncontroversial in-
formation about the terms under which his services will be avail-
able.”77 The Court reasoned further that since the primary justi-
fication for extending First Amendment protection to 
commercial speech lay in the value it provided to consumers, the 
plaintiff had only a minimal constitutionally protected interest 
“in not providing any particular factual information in his adver-
tising[.]”78 The implicit rationalization was that, akin to Justice 
Blackmun’s reasoning in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy,79 
the disclosures had a significant value to consumers.80 Based on 
this logic, the Court held that the third rule did not infringe upon 
the plaintiff’s First Amendment rights.81 
In essence, the Zauderer court rejected the Central Hudson 
test (the test governing when the government can regulate com-
mercial speech generally)82 in the context of compelled factual 
disclosures by commercial speakers and instead implemented a 
new test that is less stringent than both the Central Hudson test 
and strict scrutiny.83 The Court held that the First Amendment 
 
 76. Id. at 650. 
 77. Id. at 651. The Court also noted that compelled commercial disclosures 
were less concerning than restrictions on commercial speech. See id. at 650.  
 78. Id. (emphasis in original). The Court was, however, careful to note that 
disclosure requirements could infringe upon the First Amendment rights of ad-
vertisers, particularly if the disclosure requirements are “unjustified or unduly 
burdensome[.]” Id. at 651 (holding also that “an advertiser’s rights are ade-
quately protected as long as disclosure requirements are reasonably related to 
the State’s interest in preventing deception of consumers”). The Court declined 
to require a least-restrictive means analysis or that disclosure requirements not 
be underinclusive. See id. at 651 n.14.  
 79. See supra notes 40–41 and accompanying text.  
 80. Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 651.  
 81. Id. at 652–53.  
 82. See supra notes 45–52 and accompanying text. 
 83. See Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 651–54; see also Straub, supra note 25, at 
1216. It is unclear, however, whether the Zauderer Court intended its language 
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rights of an advertiser are protected adequately so long as the 
disclosure requirement is reasonably related to the state’s inter-
est in preventing consumer deception and declined to engage in 
a strict least-restrictive means analysis.84  
It is important to note that although Zauderer revolution-
ized the way in which courts consider compelled commercial dis-
closures under the First Amendment as it did not provide a clear 
roadmap for how the new doctrine was to be implemented. In-
deed, the Zauderer majority, whether through omission or de-
sign, did not indicate exactly how future courts should determine 
when to apply the new and deferential approach.85 At face value, 
the language of Zauderer suggests that the majority intended for 
future courts to give deference86 to all compelled commercial dis-
closure requirements so long as (1) the requirements were 
“. . . reasonably related to the State’s interest in preventing de-
ception of consumers . . .” and (2) not unjustified or unduly bur-
densome.87 Similarly, the Court’s other language, namely that 
the requirement prescribed “what shall be orthodox in commer-
cial advertising” and that it took “the form of a requirement that 
appellant include in his advertising purely factual and uncontro-
versial information about the terms under which his services 
will be available[,]” seems intended to distinguish the disclosure 
requirement from presumptively unconstitutional compulsions 
 
justifying its use of less stringent scrutiny on the facts before it to be a “test,” or 
even anything more than an explanation of one set of circumstances where such 
deference might be warranted. See infra notes 86–90 and accompanying text. 
 84. Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 651, 651 n.14. 
 85. See id. at 650–51. 
 86. Although Zauderer itself did not term its approach as one of deference, 
subsequent cases, such as NIFLA, have referred to the departure from strict 
scrutiny or the Central Hudson test as Zauderer deference. See NIFLA, 138 S. 
Ct. 2361, 2376–77 (2018) (referring to Zauderer’s deferential review). Within 
the broader First Amendment context, this terminology makes sense: typically, 
government actions affecting speech are viewed with the utmost suspicion and 
vigorously reviewed under strict scrutiny. Under Zauderer, government actions 
compelling commercial speech are viewed as less problematic, meaning courts 
are more willing to listen to, or defer to, government rationales. Id. at 651. 
 87. Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 651. This interpretation of when the Zauderer 
majority intended for Zauderer deference to apply is supported by the Zauderer 
opinion’s analysis of whether the disclosure requirement at issue survived un-
der the new deference (as opposed to the Court’s analysis of how the disclosure 
requirement was different from compelled non-commercial speech). See id. at 
651–53 (determining that the disclosure requirement at issue was constitu-
tional because it was reasonably related to the state’s interest in preventing 
consumer deception); cf. id. at 651 (distinguishing the disclosure from the 
Court’s compelled non-commercial speech jurisprudence).  
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of non-commercial speech rather than be indicative of a thresh-
old requirement for Zauderer deference to be applied.88 Despite 
the support for this interpretation, it remains unclear exactly 
how the Zauderer Court intended later courts to apply Zauderer 
deference. As this Note shows, this lack of clarity has led to a 
variety of interpretations of Zauderer in different cases, includ-
ing—and perhaps especially—NIFLA.89 
3. Pre-NIFLA Implementations of Zauderer: A Survey 
To begin, Zauderer has not been applied to disclosure re-
quirements unless the speech at issue is purely commercial. In 
Meese v. Keene, the Court did not even reference Zauderer be-
cause of an implicit recognition that the facts of the case did not 
suggest commercial speech even though it involved a disclosure 
requirement.90 In Riley v. National Federation of the Blind of 
North Carolina, Inc., the Court applied strict scrutiny instead of 
Zauderer deference to a disclosure requirement on speech that 
had “inextricably intertwined” aspects of both commercial and 
fully protected speech.91 In essence, Meese and Riley indicate 
that Zauderer is not applied to disclosure requirements unless 
the speech at issue is purely commercial.92 
When applying Zauderer, courts have varied in how broadly 
they interpret its scope.93 For instance, courts have diverged as 
to what degree of potential to mislead there must be94 and what 
 
 88. See id. at 651; see also supra Part I.A. 
 89. See infra Part I.C.3–D. 
 90. 481 U.S. 465, 471–72, 485 (1987) (involving a challenge to a federal dis-
closure requirement requiring denotations on films deemed to be “political prop-
aganda” as defined by statute). The case involved a plaintiff who wanted to show 
three foreign films but did not want be referred to as a disseminator of “foreign 
political propaganda” as defined by the statute. Id. at 467. Despite the non-ap-
plication of Zauderer, the Court’s reasoning in upholding the disclosure require-
ment was analogous to the consumer protection rationales invoked by the Zau-
derer Court. See id. at 480–81; see also supra notes 76–81 and accompanying 
text. 
 91. 487 U.S. 781, 784, 795–98 (1988) (involving a North Carolina statute 
requiring professional fundraisers soliciting charitable donations to disclose to 
donors the actual percentage of contributions the represented charities would 
receive in order to prevent contributors from being misled as to the impact of 
their donations).  
 92. See Straub, supra note 25, at 1221 (summarizing Meese and Riley).  
 93. See Note, Repackaging Zauderer, 130 HARV. L. REV. 972, 979–83 (2017). 
 94. This refers to how misleading the speech must be in order for the dis-
closure requirement to receive Zauderer deference. See, e.g., Milavetz, Gallop & 
Milavetz, P.A. v. United States, 559 U.S. 229, 234, 249 (2010); Ibanez v. Fla. 
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governmental interests95 are permissible under Zauderer. While 
many cases prior to NIFLA—such as R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. 
v. FDA and Grocery Manufacturers Ass’n v. Sorrell—interpreted 
Zauderer expansively in both respects, a number of cases began 
to push back on the trend towards expansion, leading to incon-
sistent approaches across jurisdictions. 
As part of this push back against expansive interpretations 
of Zauderer, some courts have responded by implementing a 
threshold requirement that must be cleared before Zauderer def-
erence is due.96 In Zauderer, the Court justified upholding the 
disclosure requirement at issue in part because the compelled 
disclosure was of “purely factual and uncontroversial infor-
mation[.]”97 Recently, some courts have begun using this phrase 
 
Dep’t of Bus. & Prof’l Regulation, 512 U.S. 136, 142 (1994); R.J. Reynolds To-
bacco Co. v. FDA, 696 F.3d 1205, 1214 (D.C. Cir. 2012), overruled by AMI, 760 
F.3d 18 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (en banc); cf. Disc. Tobacco City & Lottery, Inc. v. 
United States, 674 F.3d 509, 558 (6th Cir. 2012); Pub. Citizen, Inc. v. La. Attor-
ney Disciplinary Bd., 632 F.3d 212, 218 (5th Cir. 2011) (quoting Zauderer, 471 
U.S. at 651) (“A regulation that imposes a disclosure obligation on a potentially 
misleading form of advertising will survive First Amendment review if the re-
quired disclosure is ‘reasonably related to the State’s interest in preventing de-
ception of consumers.”’); Int’l Dairy Foods Ass’n v. Boggs, 622 F.3d 628, 641 (6th 
Cir. 2010); Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz, P.A. v. United States, 541 F.3d 785, 
796 (8th Cir. 2008), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, and remanded, 559 U.S. 229 
(2010). Some courts have also applied Zauderer where there is no potential to 
mislead. See AMI, 760 F.3d at 22; R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 696 F.3d at 1214; 
N.Y. State Rest. Ass’n v. N.Y.C. Bd. of Health, 556 F.3d 114, 133 (2d Cir. 2009). 
 95. For instance, courts have differed over whether “consumer interest” 
(meaning the level of interest expressed by consumers in receiving additional 
information on a topic) alone is a permissible government interest. See Repack-
aging Zauderer, supra note 93, at 982–83; see also Int’l Dairy Foods Ass’n v. 
Amestoy, 92 F.3d 67, 73 (2d Cir. 1996) (holding that although Vermont’s as-
serted interest in “the demand of its citizenry for . . . information” was genuine, 
it was inadequate to justify a disclosure requirement); cf. Grocery Mfrs. Ass’n v. 
Sorrell, 102 F. Supp. 3d 583, 597–98 (D. Vt. 2015) (upholding a compelled dis-
closure requirement regarding the use of genetic engineering in food products 
because it provided consumers with information they could use in deciding 
whether to purchase products), appeal filed, No. 15-1504-cv (2d Cir. May 6, 
2015). 
 96. See Repackaging Zauderer, supra note 93, at 983–86. 
 97. 471 U.S. 626, 651 (1985). Until relatively recently, implementing this 
phrase from Zauderer in the analysis of whether a compelled disclosure fell 
within the purview of the Zauderer test was uncommon. See Mass. Ass’n of Pri-
vate Career Sch. v. Healey, 159 F. Supp. 3d 173, 206 (D. Mass. 2016) (“[F]ew 
courts have considered the constitutionality of disclosure regulations that fail 
the ‘factual’ or ‘uncontroversial’ prerequisites of Zauderer.”). 
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as a means of rejecting compelled disclosures that might other-
wise be permissible under expansive interpretations of Zau-
derer.98 For instance, the court in Massachusetts Ass’n of Private 
Career Schools v. Healey ruled one compelled disclosure “suffi-
ciently controversial” to preclude the application of Zauderer def-
erence.99 Similarly, courts in other cases have declined to apply 
the Zauderer test where the information was not sufficiently fac-
tual.100 In R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. FDA, for example, the 
D.C. Circuit held that regulations compelling the inclusion of 
graphic messages on cigarette packaging were not compelling 
purely factual disclosures and thus were not subject to the Zau-
derer test.101 The Ninth Circuit used similar reasoning in hold-
ing the Zauderer test was inapplicable to a regulation requiring 
the disclosure of information on how to avoid radiation exposure 
from cell phones.102 However, such deployments of the purely 
factual and uncontroversial prongs as a prerequisite for applying 
the Zauderer test were not the norm. 
 
 98. See Repackaging Zauderer, supra note 93, at 984 (noting also that there 
is “[n]o consistent understanding of what either ‘factual’ or ‘controversial’ 
means” in the context of compelled disclosures). Courts have apparently imple-
mented these as two separate elements, rejecting as impermissible disclosure 
requirements that were either controversial or not factual. See id.  
 99. 159 F. Supp. 3d at 207. The regulation challenged in the case charac-
terized representations by schools that their credits “are or may be transferable” 
as “unfair or deceptive” unless the school identified other schools with which it 
had transfer agreements and indicated it was unaware of other schools which 
would accept the transfer of its credits. Id. at 206–07. The court reasoned that 
because this might force schools which had informal knowledge of the transfer-
ability of their credits to refrain from speaking at all and avoid the risk of mak-
ing a false statement, the requirement was sufficiently controversial to preclude 
the application of the Zauderer test. Id. at 207.  
 100. See Repackaging Zauderer supra note 93, at 985.  
 101. 696 F.3d 1205, 1216 (D.C. Cir. 2012). Some of the graphic warnings (in-
tended to warn of the dangers of smoking) required under the regulations in the 
case included “images of a woman crying, a small child, and [a] man wearing a 
T-shirt emblazoned with the words ‘I QUIT,’” which the court concluded were 
“primarily intended to evoke an emotional response[.]” Id. This is not the only 
time that the D.C. Circuit has declined to use the Zauderer standard based on 
a characterization of the disclosure as not purely factual. See Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs. 
v. SEC, (NAM) 748 F.3d 359 (D.C. Cir. 2014), aff’d on reh’g, (NAM II), 800 F.3d 
518 (D.C. Cir. 2015). 
 102. CTIA—The Wireless Ass’n v. City & Cty. of San Francisco, 494 Fed. 
App’x 752, 753 (9th Cir. 2012). The court reasoned that since the regulation 
could “be interpreted by consumers as expressing . . . [the] opinion that using 
cell phones is dangerous[,]” it was not purely factual and thus Zauderer did not 
apply. Id. 
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In brief, while Zauderer articulated that compelled disclo-
sures of factual information in the commercial speech context 
are subject to a lower standard of review than even normal com-
mercial speech, subsequent cases have struggled to conclusively 
interpret Zauderer. Many courts have interpreted Zauderer ex-
pansively, particularly with respect to the types of disclosures 
subject to its deferential test and the justifications governments 
may use in compelling factual disclosures. However, other courts 
have pushed back on this trend with more narrow interpreta-
tions of Zauderer and its test, typically invoking the “purely fac-
tual and uncontroversial” language from Zauderer as a prereq-
uisite to applying Zauderer scrutiny. In essence, then, little was 
truly clear about the Zauderer test prior to NIFLA other than 
that the state of the law was unclear.  
D. NIFLA: A NEW CHAPTER IN COMPELLED COMMERCIAL 
DISCLOSURE DOCTRINE 
The NIFLA holding has the potential to create a seismic 
shift in compelled commercial disclosure doctrine because of the 
Court’s interpretation of when and how Zauderer scrutiny is to 
be applied. This Section delves into the NIFLA holding to explore 
its impact, beginning by examining the statute at issue in NI-
FLA and providing a detailed factual background to the Supreme 
Court’s decision before analyzing the decision and outlining its 
legal import.  
1. The Facts and the FACT Act 
Abortion has been at the center of a particularly heated de-
bate in the U.S. for decades. While protests outside of abortion 
clinics103 are well-recognized expressions of anti-abortion senti-
ment, other abortion opponents have opened facilities called cri-
sis pregnancy centers (CPCs), which attempt to draw in women 
considering an abortion and convince them to rear the child or 
 
 103. See, e.g., U.S. Abortion Clinics Face Surge of “Emboldened” Protesters, 
Survey Shows, CBS NEWS (May 7, 2018), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/us 
-abortion-clinics-face-surge-of-trespassing-and-blockades/ [https://perma.cc/ 
B2U2-UV24]. Some abortion opponents opt for more violent means. See Liam 
Stack, A Brief History of Deadly Attacks on Abortion Providers, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 
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put it up for adoption.104 CPCs are more widely known for decep-
tive and misleading practices than the services they provide.105 
As a result, a number of government entities, including Califor-
nia, began to regulate CPCs.106  
California passed the Reproductive Freedom, Accountabil-
ity, Comprehensive Care, and Transparency Act (FACT Act) in 
2015 to regulate CPCs.107 The FACT Act required licensed facil-
ities providing ultrasounds, contraception, pregnancy tests, and 
abortions to post notices informing patients of California’s free 
and low-cost family planning services, prenatal care, and abor-
tion.108 Unlicensed facilities providing pregnancy tests, prenatal 
care, or ultrasounds were required to include the following notice 
in advertisements and display it on-site: “This facility is not li-
censed as a medical facility by the State of California and has no 
licensed medical provider who provides or directly supervises the 
provision of services.”109  
A group of pro-life pregnancy centers challenged the FACT 
Act, alleging the Act violated the rights of free exercise of religion 
and free speech.110 The district court rejected the claims, finding 
 
  104. See Amy G. Bryant & Jonas J. Swartz, Why Crisis Pregnancy Centers 
Are Legal but Unethical, 20 AMA J. ETHICS 269, 269 (2018) (arguing that CPCs 
do not live up to the standards of medical care by and to which actual doctors 
and other medical professionals live and aspire).  
 105. Id. at 270–71 (noting deceptive practices and medically false advice). In 
addition to criticisms by legitimate medical providers, CPCs have also drawn 
negative media attention for their practices and lack of accountability. See, e.g., 
LastWeekTonight, Crisis Pregnancy Centers: Last Week Tonight with John Oli-
ver (HBO), YOUTUBE (Apr. 8, 2018), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v= 
4NNpkv3Us1I [https://perma.cc/CZB4-KDTT].  
 106. See S.F., CAL. ADMIN. CODE ch. 93, §§ 93.1–.5 (2011); BALT., MD., 
HEALTH CODE §§ 3-501 to 3-505 (2009); MONTGOMERY CTY., MD., COUNCIL RES. 
NO. 16-1252 (2010); N.Y.C., N.Y. ADMIN. CODE §§ 20.815–16 (2011); AUSTIN, 
TEX., CITY CODE ch. 10-10 (2012). For a detailed discussion of each of these 
ordinances, see Beth Holtzman, Have Crisis Pregnancy Centers Finally Met 
Their Match: California’s Reproductive FACT Act, 12 NW. J.L. & SOC. POL’Y 78, 
88–95 (2017). However, most of these provisions faced legal challenges and were 
struck down, at least in part. See id.  
 107. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 123470–73 (West 2018); see also NI-
FLA, 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2368 (2018).  
 108. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY §§ 123471(a), 123472(a). Facilities had the op-
tion to distribute the notice in a number of different ways, including by posting 
it conspicuously or distributing it digitally on the patient’s arrival. Id. 
§ 123472(a)(2), invalidated by NIFLA, 138 S. Ct. at 2361. 
 109. Id. § 123472(b)(1), invalidated by NIFLA, 138 S. Ct. at 2361. 
 110. Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates v. Harris, No. 15-CV-2277 
JAH(DHB), 2016 WL 3627327, at *1 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 9, 2016). 
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that the law with respect to the licensed clinics survived both 
rational-basis and intermediate scrutiny.111 The court found that 
the law with respect to the unlicensed clinics would survive any 
level of scrutiny.112 
A Ninth Circuit panel affirmed, relying on Circuit precedent 
which detailed a spectrum of professional behavior ranging from 
highly protected public dialogue to more lowly protected profes-
sional conduct.113 The Ninth Circuit found that the FACT Act 
resided in the middle of the spectrum.114 The court upheld the 
licensed clinic notice, citing the state’s compelling interest in en-
suring women could access state-provided reproductive care and 
noting the notice was narrowly drawn.115 The unlicensed clinic 
notice was also upheld, with the court holding that it would sur-
vive even strict scrutiny.116 The case then proceeded to the Su-
preme Court.117 
2. The NIFLA Holding 
The Supreme Court overturned the Ninth Circuit’s decision, 
with Justice Thomas writing for a 5-4 majority and finding both 
requirements of the FACT Act to be unconstitutional content-
based regulations of speech.118 First, the Court rejected the 
Ninth Circuit’s professional speech continuum, declaring that 
the only exceptions to strict scrutiny for content-based regula-
tions were laws requiring the disclosure of factual, noncontro-
versial information under Zauderer and laws regulating profes-
sional conduct under Planned Parenthood of Southeastern 
Pennsylvania v. Casey.119 Second, the Court held that the li-
censed notice requirement did not fall into either the Zauderer 
 
 111. Id. at *7–8.  
 112. Id. at *9 (reasoning that the state had a compelling interest in ensuring 
patients knew whether a provider was licensed and determining the law was 
narrowly tailored to that interest).  
 113. Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates v. Harris, 839 F.3d 823, 839 (9th 
Cir. 2016).  
 114. Id.  
 115. Id. at 841–42.  
 116. Id. at 843.  
 117. See NIFLA, 138 S. Ct. 2361 (2018).  
 118. Id. at 2371, 2375, 2378. The majority characterized the FACT Act as 
content-based because compelled disclosures, which force a speaker to convey a 
particular message, alter the content of the speaker’s speech. Id. at 2371.  
 119. Id. at 2372. In Casey, the Supreme Court heard a challenge by abortion 
clinics and physicians to a series of Pennsylvania statutes imposing informed 
consent requirements for abortions and other similar abortion restrictions. 505 
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or Casey exceptions.120 The Court rejected application of Zau-
derer to the licensed notice requirement because the notice re-
quirement applied to state, not clinic services, and included 
“abortion, anything but an ‘uncontroversial’ topic.”121  
Third, the Court held that the unlicensed notice require-
ments would fail even if Zauderer was applied, as California 
failed to prove that they were not “unjustified and unduly bur-
densome.”122 In determining that the unlicensed requirement 
was unjustified, the Court asserted that California’s justification 
for the notice requirement, namely in “ensuring that ‘pregnant 
women in California know when they are getting medical care 
from licensed professionals[,]’” was no more than “purely hypo-
thetical.”123 The Court concluded that the regulation was unduly 
burdensome on two primary grounds. The Court reasoned that 
the requirement was under-inclusive, and thus unduly burden-
some, because it applied only to CPCs rather than all facilities 
where there might also be confusion over whether the facility 
 
U.S. 833, 844–45 (1992) (opinion of O’Connor, Kennedy, and Souter, JJ.). While 
the majority of the case involved consideration of abortion rights generally, the 
case has had significant First Amendment implications. See generally id. One 
of the statutory sections challenged was an informed consent requirement, re-
quiring that a physician provide certain information regarding “risks” of abor-
tion (specified by the state) to any woman seeking an abortion at least 24 hours 
before the abortion was performed. Id. at 844. The plaintiffs argued that this 
was a violation of doctors’ First Amendment rights and amounted to unconsti-
tutional compelled speech. Id. at 884. The Court rejected this challenge, how-
ever, noting that “the physician’s First Amendment rights not to speak are im-
plicated, but only as part of the practice of medicine, subject to reasonable 
licensing and regulation by the State[.]” Id. In First Amendment doctrine, there-
fore, Casey has come to stand for the idea that government can permissibly reg-
ulate professional (licensed) conduct, such as that of physicians, even though 
the First Amendment speech rights of the professional are “incidentally” in-
fringed upon. See NIFLA, 138 S. Ct. at 2372. 
 120. NIFLA, 138 S. Ct. at 2372–74. Justice Thomas reasoned that the li-
censed notice requirement was distinguishable from the permissible regulation 
in Casey because the requirement was not one of informed consent (i.e. provid-
ing a list of risks and benefits) and was held out to anyone who entered the 
facility rather than to a specific patient seeking a specific procedure. Id. at 
2373–74. Thus, he determined that the requirement directly regulated speech 
rather than professional conduct. Id. at 2374.  
 121. Id. at 2372 (distinguishing the notice requirement from the purely fac-
tual and uncontroversial language of Zauderer).  
 122. Id. at 2378.  
 123. Id. at 2377.  
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was licensed.124 Next, the Court opined that because the require-
ment that the notice be prominently included in all print and 
digital advertisements in as many languages as California 
deemed necessary was unduly burdensome because it effectively 
drowned out the speaker’s message.125 
In essence, Justice Thomas’s majority opinion requires that 
a compelled commercial disclosure requirement pass a series of 
separate tests in order to qualify for Zauderer deference. First, 
the disclosure must be (a) of purely factual information, (b) about 
the terms under which the commercial actor will provide service, 
and (c) not be about a controversial topic.126 By way of example, 
Justice Thomas reasoned that the licensed notice requirement in 
NIFLA failed the first test because it was about services offered 
by the state, not the speaker—thus failing (b)—and because the 
underlying topic of abortion was controversial.127 In particular, 
this decision interpreting “uncontroversial” as applying to the 
topic underlying the message rather than its factual veracity 
represents a seismic shift from prior interpretations of the 
“purely factual and uncontroversial” test.  
Second, if a compelled commercial disclosure survives the 
first part of the test, it is permissible only if it is not unjustified 
and unduly burdensome.128 While the licensed notice require-
ment failed to survive the first part of Thomas’s version of the 
Zauderer test,129 the unlicensed notice requirement seems to 
have passed it, primarily because Thomas proceeded straight to 
the “unjustified or unduly burdensome” prong of the test in con-
sidering it.130 The nature of the unlicensed notice requirement 
supports this inference, as the required notice was a factual 
statement about what services the facilities could provide and 
did not refer to abortion.131 Thomas concluded that the unli-
censed notice requirement failed this prong, largely relying on 
(somewhat contrived) divides between the scope of the notice and 
the cited justification, and the burden of forcing unwanted 
 
 124. Id. at 2377–78. 
 125. Id. at 2378.  
 126. See id. at 2372.  
 127. Id. Justice Thomas did not address the factuality of the licensed notice 
requirement, likely because he deemed it to unnecessary to do so. See id.  
 128. See id. at 2377. 
 129. Id.  
 130. See id. at 2377. 
 131. See id. at 2369–70.  
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speech on speakers.132 It seems unlikely that the licensed notice 
requirement would survive Justice Thomas’s interpretation of 
the second prong. Requiring a CPC to post information about 
how to get an abortion would likely constitute an undue burden 
on the CPC’s speech based on Thomas’s characterization of the 
unlicensed notice requirement as being unduly burdensome.  
Justice Kennedy, joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Jus-
tices Alito and Gorsuch, wrote a separate concurrence regarding 
what he believed to be the viewpoint discrimination133 inherent 
to the FACT Act.134 Kennedy viewed the FACT Act as forcing a 
particular group of speakers—CPCs and the abortion opponents 
behind them—to speak the government’s message regarding 
abortion.135 In his eyes, doing so forced “individuals to contradict 
their most deeply held beliefs, beliefs grounded in basic philo-
sophical, ethical, or religious precepts, or all of these.”136 Because 
the FACT Act in practice targeted CPCs and the official legisla-
tive history of the Act seemed to espouse pro-choice ideology, 
Kennedy decided that the Act was problematic due to viewpoint 
discrimination, in addition to the reasoning found in Justice 
Thomas’s majority opinion.137 
 
 132. Id. at 2375–76.  
 133. As an aside, it is worth noting that viewpoint discrimination is a par-
ticularly nebulous concept in practice, even among the numerous imprecise as-
pects of First Amendment doctrine. Indeed, despite the immense theoretical jus-
tification for a doctrine preventing against discrimination between and against 
particular viewpoints, the practical application of the doctrine leaves much to 
be desired in large part because it is easily manipulable: there is evidence to 
suggest that applications of the doctrine are often outcome driven and, at least 
in part, a function of the viewpoints held by individual judges. See James Wein-
stein, Free Speech, Abortion Access, and the Problem of Judicial Viewpoint Dis-
crimination, 29 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 471, 474–77 (1996) (noting the differing in-
vocations of the doctrine in two protest cases that were highly similar factually 
but involved different judicial viewpoints). This problem seems to be exempli-
fied by the differing treatments of the two highly similar abortion cases, NIFLA 
and Casey: although the facts in each were only modestly different, the con-
servative majority in each case only mentioned viewpoint discrimination when 
the act in question was motivated by pro-choice, rather than pro-life, concerns. 
See supra notes 119–20. See generally Weinstein, supra (discussing the context 
of the abortion debate as one that could be particularly problematic for the in-
trusion of judicial bias into determinations of viewpoint discrimination). 
 134. NIFLA, 138 S. Ct. at 2379 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 135. Id.  
 136. Id.  
 137. Id.  
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Justice Breyer, joined by Justices Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and 
Kagan vigorously dissented, noting with distaste the wide-reach-
ing negative impacts the majority ruling would have for disclo-
sure regimes.138 The dissenters sharply criticized the majority’s 
characterization of the FACT Act as content-based.139 The dis-
senters argued that deeming regulations to be content-based in 
this way threatens a host of consumer protection regulations and 
“virtually every disclosure law” in a way that has been unparal-
leled since Lochner v. New York was good law.140 In Lochner, the 
Supreme Court struck down a New York law designed to protect 
against horrific working conditions in bakeries by concluding 
that the Fourteenth Amendment created a fundamental right to 
freely contract, regardless of the consequences.141 The decision 
in Lochner crippled labor laws for decades and is widely con-
demned as one of the Supreme Court’s worst decisions, both with 
respect to legal reasoning and outcome.142 After finishing its 
analysis of the potential for the majority’s reasoning to be a new 
Lochner, the dissent applied both Casey and Zauderer to the 
FACT Act. First, the dissent in effect stressed the similarities 
between the disclosures in Casey and the FACT Act, while re-
jecting the majority’s assertion that the two were so dissimilar 
as to preclude application of Casey.143  
After concluding its analysis of the FACT Act under Casey, 
the dissent argued that the majority’s application of Zauderer to 
 
 138. Id. at 2380–81 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (noting that the majority’s ra-
tionale jeopardized the continued viability of virtually any disclosure law).  
 139. See supra note 118 and discussion therein; see also NIFLA, 138 S. Ct. 
at 2380–83 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (arguing that the FACT Act is erroneously 
considered “content-based” by the majority, and thus the majority erroneously 
applies heightened scrutiny). 
 140. Id. Lochner v. New York was widely disparaged for its hamstringing of 
labor protection regulations and effectively overruled since. Id. at 2381; see also 
Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 64 (1905) (holding that a New York state 
statute setting maximum working hours was unconstitutional because it in-
fringed upon the freedom of contract). 
 141. See Lochner, 198 U.S. at 64.  
 142. Joshua Waimberg, Lochner v. New York: Fundamental Rights and Eco-
nomic Liberty, NAT’L CONST. CTR.: CONST. DAILY (Oct. 26, 2015), https:// 
constitutioncenter.org/blog/lochner-v-new-york-fundamental-rights-and 
-economic-liberty [https://perma.cc/UJ2Q-L2CN] (discussing the legacy of the 
Lochner decision).  
 143. NIFLA, 138 S. Ct at 2380–87 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“I find it impossi-
ble to drive any meaningful legal wedge between the law, as interpreted in Ca-
sey, and the law as it should be applied in this case.”). The dissent reasoned that 
both cases involved medical matters and some type of informed consent. Id. 
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the FACT Act was also flawed.144 First, Justice Breyer opined 
that licensed disclosure requirements did in fact relate to the 
services those consumers provided: by providing information 
about state resources offering the same services, which would 
allow the patient to make an informed choice as to which services 
to use.145 Second, Breyer asserted that even if the disclosure 
were not related to the services provided by CPCs, Zauderer does 
not require such a relationship.146 Third, Breyer rejected the ma-
jority’s interpretation of the disclosure as controversial because 
of the general controversiality of abortion, noting that the actual 
information contained in the disclosure was purely factual and 
not normative.147 Fourth, Breyer argued that the majority’s ap-
proach results in unequal treatment under the law for pro-choice 
and anti-abortion groups.148 Breyer’s dissent also investigated 
the absence of consideration of viewpoint discrimination by the 
majority.149 Finally, the dissent examined the unlicensed disclo-
sure requirement, rejecting the majority’s conclusion that the 
state interest was purely hypothetical and that the requirement 
was unduly burdensome.150 
II.  THE “PURELY FACTUAL AND UNCONTROVERSIAL” 
STANDARD IS DEEPLY FLAWED   
Nearly thirty-five years after Zauderer, it is still unclear 
when commercial disclosure requirements receive Zauderer def-
erence. Courts prior to NIFLA differed widely in their interpre-
tations of Zauderer.151 Similarly, the piecemeal implementation 
 
 144. See id. at 2386–88.  
 145. Id. at 2387. 
 146. Id.  
 147. Id. at 2388 (“Abortion is a controversial topic and a source of normative 
debate, but the availability of state resources is not a normative statement or a 
fact of debatable truth. The disclosure includes information about resources 
available should a woman seek to continue her pregnancy or terminate it, and 
it expresses no official preference for one choice over the other.”). While not do-
ing so explicitly, Justice Breyer takes an approach to controversiality that rec-
ognizes that something cannot be purely factual and also be controversial. See 
id. 
 148. Id. (noting the differential treatment of First Amendment rights of anti-
abortion medical service providers in NIFLA as opposed to pro-choice medical 
service providers in Casey). 
 149. Id. at 2388–89.  
 150. Id. at 2389–92. 
 151. See supra Part I.C.3. 
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of the “purely factual and uncontroversial” language from Zau-
derer as a threshold requirement led to confusing jurisdictional 
splits regarding the new standard.152 As confusing and problem-
atic as Zauderer doctrine was prior to NIFLA, however, the ma-
jority opinion in NIFLA made it far worse. This Part focuses on 
the seismic shift in how the “uncontroversial” prong of the 
“purely factual and uncontroversial” standard is apparently to 
be considered that the NIFLA majority implements.153  
This Part demonstrates that the doctrine governing when 
and how Zauderer deference should be granted needs fundamen-
tal revision for three main reasons. Section A argues that Zau-
derer was unclear, leaving open an interpretive vacuum. Courts 
attempted to fill this vacuum, but created an even more tortured 
and confusing body of law. Thus, Section A shows that even be-
fore NIFLA, clarification as to when Zauderer applied was nec-
essary. Sections B and C demonstrate that NIFLA was not the 
clarifying change shown necessary by Section A. Section B ar-
gues that the NIFLA majority’s interpretation of the “uncontro-
versial” prong is problematic due to the disturbing inherent sub-
jectivity of determining which topics are controversial, allowing 
judges’ personal opinions to operate as factual determinations. 
Section C asserts that the NIFLA majority’s interpretation of the 
“uncontroversial” prong is concerning because it undermines the 
consumer protection interests at the heart of both Zauderer and 
the Court’s entire commercial speech jurisprudence. Section D 
briefly rebuts counterarguments to Sections A, B, and C.  
A. THE PURELY FACTUAL AND UNCONTROVERSIAL STANDARD 
WAS PROBLEMATIC PRIOR TO NIFLA 
Even before NIFLA, it was unclear when compelled commer-
cial disclosures would receive Zauderer deference. As it was 
gradually implemented, the “purely factual and uncontroversial” 
standard was particularly confusing, with numerous different 
interpretations of the standard and when it was to be applied.154 
 
 152. See supra Part I.C.3; see also infra Part II.A.2 (giving background on 
how courts interpret the Zauderer standard).  
 153. See supra notes 121, 126–31 and accompanying text.  
 154. See Lyle Denniston, After Three Decades, Does Zauderer Need Updat-
ing?, SCOTUSBLOG (Nov. 18, 2014, 5:28PM), https://www.scotusblog.com/2014/ 
11/after-three-decades-does-zauderer-need-updating/ [https://perma.cc/5R4U 
-TLXR]; see also supra Part I.C.3 (outlining the varied interpretations of Zau-
derer pre-NIFLA). 
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First, this Section notes Zauderer was unclear as to which com-
pelled commercial disclosure requirements receive Zauderer def-
erence. Next, this Section describes how the rise of the “purely 
factual and uncontroversial” threshold requirement exacerbated 
the confusion surrounding Zauderer. Ultimately, this Section 
demonstrates that the question of when to implement Zauderer 
deference needs fundamental reconsideration.  
1. Zauderer Failed to Create a Clear Template for How to 
Apply the New Level of Deference It Created 
Zauderer was unclear as to exactly how to evaluate commer-
cial disclosure requirements.155 The Zauderer Court only noted 
that the regulation at issue had “attempted only to prescribe 
what shall be orthodox in commercial advertising” in the form of 
requiring the inclusion of “purely factual and uncontroversial in-
formation about the terms under which . . . services will be avail-
able[,]” and that the speaker had a minimal constitutionally pro-
tected interest in not disclosing that information except to the 
extent the disclosure requirement was “unjustified or unduly 
burdensome.”156 While the language of Zauderer seems to sug-
gest the Court intended compelled commercial disclosure re-
quirements to be evaluated on the basis of whether they were 
reasonably related to state interests in preventing consumer de-
ception and whether they were unjustified or unduly burden-
some, this interpretation is hardly conclusive.157 In addition, it 
is not clear that the Zauderer Court intended the “purely factual 
and uncontroversial” standard to be a prerequisite standard for 
Zauderer scrutiny.158 In brief, Zauderer is not entirely clear as 
to when Zauderer deference should be applied, but does seem to 
suggest that the “purely factual and uncontroversial” language 
should not have been implemented as a standard. 
2. Purely Factual and Uncontroversial: One New Standard, 
Two Confusing and Problematic Prongs 
Despite the apparent views of the Zauderer Court discussed 
above, much of the subsequent case law has invoked Zauderer’s 
“purely factual and uncontroversial” language as a prerequisite 
 
 155. See supra notes 85–89 and accompanying text. 
 156. Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 651 (1985).  
 157. See supra notes 85–89 and accompanying text. 
 158. See supra notes 85–89 and accompanying text. 
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to applying Zauderer.159 As a result of this trend, courts grappled 
with how to implement the new “standard.”160 While the “stand-
ard” is recited as a unit, decisions following Zauderer turned it 
into two separate requirements—a disclosure requirement must 
be both (1) purely factual and (2) uncontroversial.161 These deci-
sions reached different conclusions as to the meaning of both 
prongs of the standard.162 In effect, the piecemeal development 
of the new standard led to confusing implementations, as various 
courts struck down a variety of disclosure requirements for fail-
ing to meet one prong or the other of the new standard. 
The “purely factual” prong has been engaged with exten-
sively, particularly in the context of compelled image “disclo-
sures.” The Sixth Circuit upheld graphic cigarette label warn-
ings alongside textual warnings under Zauderer because the 
textual warnings were factual and accurate even if the graphics 
were nonliteral and emotionally provocative.163 In a separate 
opinion, the Court noted that facts, including those presented 
graphically, could “disconcert, displease, provoke an emotional 
response, spark controversy, and even overwhelm reason, but 
that does not magically turn such facts into opinions.”164 While 
many scholars agreed with the Sixth Circuit’s conclusion,165 the 
D.C. Circuit refused to apply Zauderer scrutiny to graphic ciga-
rette warning labels, finding that they were not purely factual 
because they were primarily intended to evoke an emotional re-
sponse.166 Other courts have differentiated what is “purely fac-
tual” from what is subjective or opinion-based. Several circuits 
 
 159. See, e.g., Mass. Ass’n of Private Career Sch. v. Healey, 159 F. Supp. 3d 
173, 206 (D. Mass. 2016).  
 160. See infra notes 163–73 and accompanying text. 
 161. See infra notes 163–73 and accompanying text. 
 162. See infra notes 163–73 and accompanying text. 
 163. Disc. Tobacco City & Lottery, Inc. v. United States, 674 F.3d 509, 524–
27, 559, 569 (6th Cir. 2012).  
 164. Id. at 569 (Stranch, J., separate opinion).  
 165. See, e.g., Caroline Mala Corbin, Emotional Compelled Disclosures, 127 
HARV. L. REV. F. 357, 361 (2014); Rebecca Tushnet, More than a Feeling: Emo-
tion and the First Amendment, 127 HARV. L. REV. 2392, 2406–07 (2014). 
 166. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. FDA, 696 F.3d 1205, 1209–22 (D.C. Cir. 
2012), overruled by AMI, 760 F.3d 18 (2014) (en banc). Some writers have de-
scribed Reynolds’ approach as ironic, noting that the informative power of dis-
closures increases as they evoke emotions, particularly important are the po-
tential consequences of failing to ignore health warnings in the smoking context. 
See, e.g., Ellen P. Goodman, Visual Gut Punch: Persuasion, Emotion, and the 
Constitutional Meaning of Graphic Disclosure, 99 CORNELL L. REV. 513, 537–
38 (2014); see also R. George Wright, Are There First Amendment “Vacuums”: 
  
582 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [104:553 
 
declined to find mandated disclosure labels to be purely factual, 
despite explicit statutory definitions of the label content, where 
the statutory definition itself was subjective.167 While this par-
ticular approach is less confusing than its counterpart discussed 
above, the “purely factual” prong as a whole is still mired in con-
fusion, which may be further exacerbated going forward by the 
rise of alternative facts.168 
Despite the differing interpretations of the “purely factual” 
prong of the Zauderer standard discussed above, the “uncontro-
versial” prong prior to NIFLA was mired in even more contro-
versy.169 Several circuits arrived at dramatically different con-
clusions regarding the meaning of uncontroversial. First, courts 
in the Ninth Circuit interpreted “uncontroversial” as being effec-
tively the same as “purely factual,” meaning that the facts them-
selves are truthful.170 Conversely, the D.C. Circuit explicitly 
 
The Case of the Free Speech Challenge to Tobacco Package Labeling Require-
ments, 76 ALB. L. REV. 613, 625 (2012) (noting that some points may need to be 
made in an “inflammatory” fashion in order to be effective). Others, however, 
have written in apparent support of the Reynolds approach, noting that fear-
based appeals such as the graphic warning labels are in essence conveying a 
normative message from the government discouraging use of the product in 
question rather than purely factual information intended to help consumers de-
cide for themselves whether to use a product. See Jennifer M. Keighley, Can 
You Handle the Truth? Compelled Commercial Speech and the First Amend-
ment, 15 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 539, 578–85 (2012). For a general discussion cri-
tiquing the Reynolds majority’s approach to images, see Peter Bozzo, The 
Treachery of Images: Reinterpreting Compelled Commercial-Speech Doctrine, 66 
DEPAUL L. REV. 965 (2017). 
 167. See, e.g., NAM II, 800 F.3d 518, 529–30 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (quoting NAM, 
748 F.3d 359, 363 (D.C. Cir. 2014)) (holding that a statutory definition of “con-
flict free” with respect to imported minerals was “hardly ‘factual and non-ideo-
logical’”). Other circuits have implemented similar reasoning with respect to la-
bels affixed to video game packaging in accordance with state definitions of 
material that they deemed inappropriate for children under the age of 18 (both 
circuits deemed the statutory definition to be too subjective to be purely factual). 
See Video Software Dealers Ass’n v. Schwarzenegger, 556 F.3d 950, 965–67 (9th 
Cir. 2009); Entm’t Software Ass’n v. Blagojevich, 469 F.3d 641, 652 (7th Cir. 
2006). 
 168. See Leading Cases: NIFLA supra note 69, at 353 (noting that even “sci-
entific or historical facts [have] become controversial”).  
 169. See AMI, 760 F.3d at 34 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring in the judgment) 
(“[I]t is unclear how [courts] should assess . . . whether a mandatory disclosure 
is controversial.”).  
 170. CTIA—The Wireless Ass’n v. City of Berkeley, 854 F.3d 1105, 1117–18 
(9th Cir. 2017) (declaring that ‘“uncontroversial’ in this context refers to the 
factual accuracy of the compelled disclosure, not to its subjective impact on the 
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noted that “uncontroversial” must mean something other than 
“purely factual.”171 In AMI, controversial was defined as some-
thing that “communicates a message that is controversial for 
some reason other than dispute about simple factual accu-
racy.”172 This conception of “uncontroversial” as something dif-
ferent than “purely factual” was reiterated in NAM, with the 
Court declaring that the two prongs must have some separate 
meaning.173 In brief, courts prior to NIFLA disagreed on what 
“uncontroversial” meant. 
In conclusion, it is readily apparent that Zauderer defer-
ence—specifically the question of when and how it is to be ap-
plied—needs fundamental reconsideration. Zauderer was un-
clear as to when commercial disclosure requirements receive 
deference,174 but the “purely factual and uncontroversial” stand-
ard that arose in the interpretive vacuum left by Zauderer is far 
more confusing and inconsistent.175 Thus, courts need to con-
sider updating the doctrine. 
 
audience.”). The Ninth Circuit implemented this interpretation again in Amer-
ican Beverage Ass’n v. City & County of San Francisco, finding that a disclosure 
regarding the health risks of sugary beverages was controversial because of the 
contested accuracy of the facts in the disclosure. 871 F.3d 884, 892–93, 895 (9th 
Cir. 2017), rev’d en banc, 916 F.3d 749 (9th Cir. 2019); see also infra note 182 
(explaining the en banc holding). Some authors have supported this interpreta-
tion. See Dayna B. Royal, Resolving the Compelled-Commercial-Speech Conun-
drum, 19 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 205, 236–37 (2011) (“[W]hether the fact is con-
troverted . . . asks whether there is disagreement over the fact’s truth, not 
whether there is disagreement over disclosing the fact.”). But see Repackaging 
Zauderer, supra note 93, at 984 n.73 (characterizing this approach as a “rela-
tively banal understanding” of Zauderer). However, some other courts, includ-
ing some in the D.C. Circuit, seem to also subscribe to this interpretation, at 
least partially. See infra note 173. 
 171. See AMI, 760 F.3d at 23, 27; see also NAM II, 800 F.3d at 528–29 (con-
ducting an analysis based on the assumption that “uncontroversial” and “purely 
factual” have different meanings). 
 172. AMI, 760 F.3d at 27.  
 173. NAM II, 800 F.3d at 528–29 (defining “controversy” as “a dispute, espe-
cially a public one”). It is worth noting that Reynolds also put forth a definition 
of “controversial,” declaring a disclosure to be controversial when it would be 
“subject to misinterpretation by consumers.” Reynolds, 696 F.3d at 1217, over-
ruled by AMI, 760 F.3d at 18.  
 174. See supra Part II.A.1. 
 175. See supra notes 159–73 and accompanying text. 
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B. NIFLA’S VERSION OF THE “UNCONTROVERSIAL” PRONG 
RENDERS IT IMPERMISSIBLY PRONE TO SUBSTITUTIONS OF 
JUDICIAL OPINION FOR FACT 
The “purely factual and uncontroversial” standard was un-
clear before NIFLA,176 but the majority opinion in NIFLA made 
it worse. There can be little doubt that both the notices in NIFLA 
were purely factual.177 The FACT Act merely stated the services 
that the state provided for low-income women.178 However, Jus-
tice Thomas and the majority ignored the factuality of the dis-
closures and implemented an interpretation of the “uncontrover-
sial” prong of the Zauderer standard that no circuit court (and 
few district courts) had even considered.179 Rather than deter-
mining controversiality based on the information in the disclo-
sure, the majority instead focused on the controversiality of the 
underlying topic—abortion.180 Even before NIFLA, writers noted 
that the “uncontroversial” prong of the Zauderer standard left 
open an uncomfortably large window for the subjective beliefs of 
judges to influence their decision making.181 Following the NI-
FLA decision, that window is opened even further.182 Judges now 
 
 176. See supra Part II.A.2. 
 177. See NIFLA, 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2368–70 (2018).  
 178. See Leading Cases: NIFLA supra note 69, at 353.  
 179. See NIFLA, 138 S. Ct. at 2372. 
 180. Id. It is worth noting that NIFLA is not the first decision to approach 
the “purely factual and uncontroversial” standard in this way. See Evergreen 
Ass’n Inc. v. City of New York, 740 F.3d 233, 245 n.6 (2d Cir. 2014). This ap-
proach is in marked contrast to that of a court hearing a challenge to a GMO 
labeling requirement in Vermont. Grocery Mfrs. Ass’n v. Sorrell, 102 F. Supp. 
3d 583, 628–29 (D. Vt. 2015) (noting that the compelled information must itself 
be controversial). On appeal, the plaintiffs argued the requirement failed Zau-
derer because the topic of GMOs was controversial, but the appeal was never 
heard. See Nigel Barrella, First Amendment Limits on Compulsory Labeling, 71 
FOOD & DRUG L.J. 519, 534 (2016). 
 181. See Repackaging Zauderer, supra note 93, at 989.  
 182. Given that NIFLA’s recency has given little time for many examples of 
this to develop, perhaps the best example to develop thus far comes from an en 
banc rehearing of American Beverage Ass’n v. City and Cty. of S.F., 916 F.3d 749 
(9th Cir. 2019) (en banc). See also supra note 170 (providing background infor-
mation on the case). The majority rejected the notice regarding the health risks 
of sugary foods and drinks as being unduly burdensome because the notice was 
required to take up 20% of the space of the advertisement. Am. Beverage, 916 
F.3d at 757. In a separate concurrence, however, Judge Ikuta argued that the 
notice was not permissible under Zauderer because the health risks of sugar 
were a controversial topic. See id. at 761 (Ikuta, J., concurring). Although this 
determination was not entirely outlandish (namely because statements by the 
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not only have the leeway to interpret whether a message itself is 
controversial under the “purely factual and uncontroversial” 
standard, but also which topics are controversial.183 This Section 
argues that the alarming potential for the replacement of fact 
with opinion in deciding what topics are permissible under the 
“uncontroversial” prong mandates a fundamental reconsidera-
tion and revision of Zauderer deference and its application post-
NIFLA.  
The NIFLA majority’s new approach to the “uncontrover-
sial” prong poses a grave threat to the commercial disclosure re-
gime. Increasing partisanship and politicization of facts could 
render virtually any topic controversial, precluding Zauderer 
deference.184 For instance, take the commercial disclosure re-
quirements in Section C.1 of Part I.185 should attorneys be forced 
to disclose in advertisements that clients may have to pay other-
wise undisclosed costs?186 Those with heated opinions on lawyers 
and legal billing would find the underlying topic controversial. 
Similarly, if one subscribes to laissez faire economics, such a re-
quirement could be controversial because the underlying topic—
regulation—is controversial. Should meat packages be required 
to bear country of origin labels?187 The debate over domestic pro-
duction and globalization is controversial to many. Alterna-
tively, what if a pro-choice court heard a case with a disclosure 
requirement similar to that in Casey188 but in a commercial 
speech context that would put it within Zauderer’s purview? 
That court could easily reject such a requirement under the NI-
FLA majority’s interpretation of “uncontroversial” as applying to 
 
FDA indicated that sugar consumption was safe at certain levels), generally ac-
cepted norms suggest that the idea of health risks posed by added sugars is far 
from controversial. See id.; see also Goodman, supra note 166, at 553 (noting 
that reducing sugar is almost universally perceived as a positive health benefit). 
While this is not nearly as bad an example of substituting a judicial opinion 
regarding the controversiality of a topic, it is the closest actual example given 
the recency of NIFLA. Still, given the only slight deviations in severity between 
the FDA statements and the required notice, rejecting the requirement on con-
troversiality grounds seems to fit within the dangers of the NIFLA approach 
discussed above. 
 183. See NIFLA, 138 S. Ct. at 2372; Am. Beverage, 916 F.3d at 749. 
 184. See Leading Cases: NIFLA supra note 69, at 353.  
 185. See supra notes 63–69 and accompanying text. 
 186. See Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 625, 636, 650–
53 (1985).  
 187. See AMI, 760 F.3d 18, 20 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (en banc).  
 188. See supra note 119 (providing a discussion and brief analysis of the facts 
in Casey).  
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the underlying topic because curtailing a woman’s right to abor-
tion is almost certainly as controversial as abortion generally. 
Even the topic of compelled commercial speech generally could 
be deemed highly controversial.189 Perhaps most importantly, 
even scientifically verifiable information—such as climate sci-
ence—could be controversial because some small subset of the 
population disagrees with it. Thus, the potential for the subjec-
tive beliefs of judges to dictate what topics are controversial jeop-
ardizes the commercial disclosure regime and mandates revision 
of the Zauderer doctrine. 
C. NIFLA’S VERSION OF THE “UNCONTROVERSIAL” PRONG 
UNDERMINES CONSUMER PROTECTION INTERESTS 
Zauderer and Virginia State Board of Pharmacy recognize 
that commercial speech derives its value from its ability to in-
form consumers by helping them make informed decisions and 
forcing speakers to provide additional information when their 
message is otherwise misleading.190 This Section demonstrates 
that the NIFLA majority’s interpretation of the “uncontrover-
sial” prong undermines consumer interests by affording commer-
cial speakers with a level of protection that prior precedent does 
not justify. 
First, obstacles reducing the flow of information to consum-
ers almost always reduce their ability to make informed deci-
sions. By interpreting the meaning of the “uncontroversial” 
prong so broadly,191 the NIFLA majority created a precedent 
which dramatically reduces the number of viable compelled com-
mercial disclosure regulations and thus the flow of information 
to consumers. Since commercial speech directly derives its value 
from its ability to inform consumers, altering the requirements 
for Zauderer deference directly undermines that value.  
Second, the consumer interest in information about prod-
ucts or services pertaining to a controversial underlying topic is 
even greater than normal. This seems self-evident: consumers 
put more thought and research into decisions that are more 
costly or otherwise worth more to them. This is why, for most 
 
 189. See, e.g., Brief for the Cato Institute as Amicus Curiae in Support of 
Petitioners at 14, Nationwide Biweekly Admin. v. Hubanks, No. 17-1161 (Mar. 
21, 2018). 
 190. See supra notes 40–41, 76–81 and accompanying text.  
 191. See supra Part II.B. The NIFLA Court’s interpretation of the “uncon-
troversial” prong was broad because it effectively rendered any disclosure to be 
controversial, since virtually any underlying topic can be controversial.  
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consumers, deciding which car to buy requires significantly more 
thought and information than deciding which napkins to buy. 
Take, for instance, the debate surrounding GMOs. Many con-
sumers desire the labels of their food products to provide them 
with information about whether the product includes GMO in-
gredients precisely because GMOs are a matter of some contro-
versy.192 Similarly, although climate change is also quite likely 
a controversial topic, many consumers are particularly inter-
ested in the fuel efficiency of their cars precisely because they 
desire to know the car’s environmental impact. In sum, consum-
ers rely on information the most when they are forced to make a 
decision regarding a controversial topic. 
D. THE NEW INTERPRETATION OF THE CONTROVERSIALITY 
STANDARD IS NOT NECESSARY TO PROTECT RELIGIOUS OR 
MISSION-DRIVEN COMMERCIAL SPEAKERS 
In Zauderer, the Court explicitly stated that a commercial 
speaker had a minimal interest in not saying or disclosing fac-
tual information.193 What if, for one reason or another, a com-
mercial speaker did have some heightened interest in non-dis-
closure? There is a plausible argument to be made that speakers 
that are religious or are otherwise mission-driven have a higher 
interest than the average advertiser or commercial speaker. For 
instance, Justice Kennedy’s NIFLA concurrence implicitly seems 
to suggest that the anti-abortion advocates in NIFLA—but po-
tentially also other faith-based advocates outside of the abortion 
context—had a particularly high interest in non-disclosure.194 
Even accepting this premise, there remains the question of what 
types of mission-driven speakers could argue such a heightened 
interest in non-disclosure. For example, physicians are mission-
driven: their mission is to provide scientifically validated treat-
ment and counsel that adheres to strict standards of care.195 As 
 
 192. Disclosure requirements regarding GMOs have already been chal-
lenged and upheld. See, e.g., Grocery Mfrs. Ass’n v. Sorrell, 102 F. Supp. 3d 583, 
628–29 (D. Vt. 2015). 
 193. See Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 651 (1985); 
see also supra Part I.C.3 (explaining the reduced free speech protections pro-
vided to commercial disclosures under Zauderer). 
 194. Kennedy noted that the FACT Act forced “individuals to contradict 
their most deeply held beliefs, beliefs grounded in basic philosophical, ethical, 
or religious precepts . . . [.]” NIFLA, 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2379 (2018) (Kennedy, J., 
concurring). From this perspective, CPCs may have a higher interest in non-
disclosure than other commercial speakers. See Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 650–53. 
 195. See Bryant & Swartz, supra note 104, at 271. 
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persuasive as the argument of the potential for a commercial 
speaker’s heightened interest in non-disclosure may be—espe-
cially if one regards religiously motivated speakers in a special 
light—it is no justification for interpreting the “uncontroversial” 
prong so broadly as to jeopardize disclosure requirements when-
ever the speaker can contrive an argument for a controversial 
topic.  
Instead, religious or mission-driven speakers can be pro-
tected by other aspects of commercial speech jurisprudence. Zau-
derer itself provides a better option for protection than the new 
interpretation of the “uncontroversial” prong. Arguably, requir-
ing a speaker to make a commercial disclosure with a message 
to which it is diametrically opposed is an undue burden.196 In-
deed, Justice Kennedy’s portrayal of the hardships CPC opera-
tors faced due to the FACT Act credibly suggests an undue bur-
den.197 
In addition, the Court has already recognized that where 
commercial speech is inextricably intertwined with fully pro-
tected speech (such as advocacy for mission-driven charities), 
both the commercial and fully protected speech are reviewed un-
der strict scrutiny as any content-based curtailment of entirely 
fully protected speech would be.198 Thus, in NIFLA for instance, 
regulation of an advertisement for an unlicensed facility at-
tempting to draw women to the CPC but also advocating against 
abortion in some inextricable way would be subject to strict scru-
tiny even without the NIFLA majority’s interpretation of the 
“uncontroversial prong.” 
III.  THE ROAD AHEAD: SOLUTIONS FOR ZAUDERER 
DEFERENCE POST-NIFLA   
As established in the previous part, the question of when 
and how Zauderer deference should be applied is fraught and 
problematic, largely because Zauderer did not clarify how subse-
quent courts should apply the doctrine it created. Any modifica-
tions to the standard going forward must take into account three 
primary concerns in order to effectively revitalize and clarify the 
doctrine.199 First, a good solution must mitigate the linguistic in-
coherence and lack of clarity inherent to Zauderer deference 
 
 196. See Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 651. 
 197. See NIFLA, 138 S. Ct. at 2379 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 198. See supra note 91 and accompanying text. 
 199. See supra Part II. 
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prior to NIFLA. Second, any solution must correct the way in 
which the NIFLA majority rewrote the “uncontroversial” prong 
to be ripe for exploitation by judicial bias. Third, such a solution 
must remedy the fundamental divorce from the consumer pro-
tection and information interests at the very core of all commer-
cial speech doctrine since Virginia State Board of Pharmacy that 
the NIFLA majority perpetuated.200 This part argues that wip-
ing the Zauderer slate clean—and returning to the “unduly bur-
densome” test that the Zauderer Court arguably intended—is 
the best way to address all three of those concerns.  
A. WIPING THE ZAUDERER SLATE CLEAN: WHY THE SUPREME 
COURT SHOULD RETURN TO THE ORIGINAL TEST ARGUABLY 
POSED BY ZAUDERER 
First, the best option would likely be for the Supreme Court 
to overrule much of the post-Zauderer jurisprudence of the last 
roughly thirty-five years and start anew with a clean slate and 
a clarification and revitalization of the original Zauderer test. As 
discussed above, it seems unlikely that the Zauderer Court in-
tended the “purely factual and uncontroversial language” in its 
opinion to be more than a characterization of a sufficient set of 
facts to justify the use of deferential Zauderer scrutiny.201 The 
fact that the Court in Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz P.A. v. United 
States declined to use the standard as a threshold requirement, 
or even repeat the language less than ten years ago suggests this 
is still a viable option despite the NIFLA holding.202 Instead, the 
“unjustified or unduly burdensome” language of Zauderer could 
replace the “purely factual and uncontroversial” standard as 
used in NIFLA.203 Indeed, this seems to be the approach that the 
 
 200. See supra notes 33–41 and accompanying text. 
 201. See supra Part II.A.1.  
 202. See Milavetz, Gallop, and Milavetz, P.A. v. United States, 559 U.S. 229, 
249–51 (2010). 
 203. This Section focuses exclusively on the “unduly burdensome” prong of 
the “unjustified or unduly burdensome” standard for several reasons (including 
brevity). First, this Section seeks to analyze the “unduly burdensome” prong in 
particular as a substitute for what the NIFLA Court seemed to be trying to ac-
complish through its new understanding of “uncontroversial.” See NIFLA, 138 
S. Ct. 2361, 2372 (2018). Second, scholars have suggested that the “unjustified” 
prong—sometimes considered as a requirement that a disclosure requirement 
be “rationally related” to a permissible government interest—is more permis-
sive than the second prong, reducing its efficacy in accomplishing the apparent 
goals of the NIFLA majority. See Nat Stern & Mark Joseph Stern, Advancing 
an Adaptive Standard of Strict Scrutiny for Content-Based Commercial Speech 
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Zauderer Court took in analyzing the facts before it.204 This sec-
tion briefly considers how courts have implemented the “unjus-
tified or unduly burdensome” test before arguing that a slightly 
more expansive version of the “unduly burdensome” prong could 
achieve the apparent goal of the NIFLA majority in approaching 
controversiality at the topic level while also addressing the con-
cerns about the NIFLA approach raised in Part II.  
1. Courts So Far Have Primarily Found Disclosures “Unduly 
Burdensome” Under Zauderer Due to Size 
Thus far, courts have invoked the “unduly burdensome” test 
largely when striking down mandated disclosures based on their 
size. In NIFLA, for instance, the majority reasoned that the un-
licensed notice was unduly burdensome in part because it could 
require a two word message—“Choose Life”—to be surrounded 
by California’s required message under the FACT Act in as many 
as thirteen different languages.205 Similarly, in an en banc re-
hearing of American Beverage Ass’n v. City and County of San 
Francisco before the Ninth Circuit, the majority reasoned that 
the disclosure requirement at issue was unjustified and unduly 
burdensome in part because expert testimony showed that simi-
lar warnings had demanded a significantly smaller percentage 
of space of the total advertisement.206 Numerous other cases 
have also followed this approach.207 
At the heart of this effectively size-based approach is a reli-
ance on the same consumer protection justifications the Su-
preme Court cited in both Virginia State Board of Pharmacy208 
 
Regulation, 47 U. RICH. L. REV. 1171, 1189 (2013) (“A compelled disclosure that 
is reasonably related to preventing deception can hardly be unjustified, and so 
scrutiny should be focused on its burden.”); see also Repackaging Zauderer, su-
pra note 93, at 989 (highlighting a set of cases that suggest a disclosure must 
be “rationally related” to the government interest, otherwise it poses an “undue 
burden” on the commercial speaker).  
 204. See supra notes 85–89. 
 205. NIFLA, 138 S. Ct. at 2378; see also supra Part I.D (summarizing NI-
FLA’s holding and impact). 
 206. 916 F.3d 749, 757 (9th Cir. 2019) (en banc); see also supra note 168 
(providing background information on the case).  
 207. See, e.g., Ibanez v. Florida Dep’t of Bus. and Prof’l Regulation, 512 U.S. 
136, 146–47 (1994); see also Rebecca Tushnet, COOL Story: Country of Origin 
Labeling and the First Amendment, 70 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 25, 31 (2015) (detail-
ing why the Country of Origin Law was not an undue burden because of its high 
government interest); Repackaging Zauderer, supra note 93, at 989–93. 
 208. See supra notes 40–41 and accompanying text.  
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and Zauderer:209 protections for commercial speech and disclo-
sure requirements on commercial speech are both justified be-
cause they increase vital flows of information to consumers. In 
cases rejecting disclosures as unduly burdensome based on size, 
courts have made the rational assumption that excessively long 
disclosures have a high risk of “effectively rul[ing] out” certain 
types of speech, thus decreasing the flow of information to con-
sumers.210 Because such disclosure requirements impermissibly 
intrude upon the flow of information to consumers rather than 
supplementing it, they do not receive Zauderer deference under 
this approach.  
Before moving on to the changes to the “unduly burden-
some” standard that this Note suggests, however, it is worth not-
ing that a simple substitution of the size-focused version of the 
“unduly burdensome standard” for the “purely factual and un-
controversial” standard would at the very least mitigate, if not 
remove entirely, the issues raised in Part II. First, although the 
Zauderer Court did not specifically address what an “unduly bur-
densome” disclosure requirement might be,211 there has been no 
subsequent piecemeal development of the standard in divergent 
and confusing directions.212 This lack of divergent interpreta-
tions, coupled with the fact that it is far easier to determine the 
size of a disclosure relative to the speech it accompanies than it 
is to determine the controversiality of a disclosure, renders this 
version of the standard far less confusing. Second, this version 
of the standard permits very little room for judicial bias. If the 
metric is truly one of how much space a mandated disclosure 
would take up, or whether some similar consideration would ef-
fectively rule out some types of speech, there is much less leeway 
for a judge to decide based on bias than there is in deciding 
 
 209. See supra Part I.C.2.  
 210. See Ibanez, 512 U.S. at 146 (reasoning that a requirement that special-
ists disclose a great deal of information regarding their specialist designation 
“effectively rule[d] out notation of the ‘specialist’ designation on a business card 
or letterhead, or in a yellow pages listing”); see also Robert Post, Lecture, Com-
pelled Commercial Speech, 117 W. VA. L. REV. 867, 900 (2015) (noting that un-
duly burdensome disclosure requirements can chill the flow of information to 
consumers in a manner that is inconsistent with the primary justifications for 
commercial speech doctrine).  
 211. See Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 651 (1985).  
 212. Cf. supra Part II.A (explaining why the “purely factual and uncontro-
versial” standard is problematic in general). 
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whether the underlying topic is controversial.213 Finally, as dis-
cussed in the preceding paragraph, this approach is aligned with 
the consumer protection and information interests at the heart 
of commercial speech doctrine, and does not need wholesale re-
consideration and revision in order to address these concerns.214  
2. A More Expansive Interpretation of the “Unduly 
Burdensome” Test Could Be the Best Path Forward for 
Zauderer Deference Post-NIFLA 
While interpreting the “unduly burdensome” standard 
simply as a limit on the size of disclosures has its advantages, 
implementing a more expansive interpretation represents the 
best path forward for protecting commercial disclosure regimes 
post-NIFLA.215 At first glance, it might seem counterintuitive to 
suggest that effectively raising the bar that a disclosure require-
ment must clear is a good option for protecting disclosure re-
quirements. However, courts of late have begun to interpret the 
First Amendment in ways that show an increasing solicitude for 
commercial speakers, particularly where speakers have certain 
religious or political views.216 Because of this trend, the best 
likely approach of implementing the “unduly burdensome” 
standard in place of the “purely factual and uncontroversial” 
standard is simply to strike a middle course: articulate a version 
of the “unduly burdensome” standard that gives courts some lee-
way to strike down disclosure requirements that are unduly bur-
densome for reasons beyond the size of the disclosure, but still 
protects commercial disclosure regimes from the broad version 
of the “purely factual and uncontroversial” standard articulated 
in NIFLA.  
 
 213. See supra Part II.B. 
 214. Cf. supra Part II.C (outlining why NIFLA’s interpretation of the purely 
factual and uncontroversial standard undermines consumer protections).  
 215. For the sake of clarity, interpreting the standard more expansively—as 
this subsection suggests—would still be inclusive of the sizing considerations 
discussed in Part III.A.1.  
 216. See generally NIFLA, 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2368–78 (2018) (finding that the 
FACT Act disclosure was content-based, and subject to strict scrutiny under the 
First Amendment); Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 
138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018) (holding that a cake shop owner can refuse to make a 
cake for a same sex wedding); Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010) (al-
lowing corporations to advocate directly for their political preferences).  
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This approach has several key merits. First, it mitigates 
concerns regarding the overexpansion of Zauderer scrutiny217 
without also jeopardizing otherwise meritorious and purely fac-
tual disclosure requirements due to subjective interpretations of 
controversy. For instance, disclosures requiring a commercial 
speaker to guide consumers to a competing business218 or state 
service could be unduly burdensome,219 while still protecting, for 
example, requirements that casinos include information on how 
to get help for gambling addictions in their advertisements.220 
This approach could also protect commercial speakers motivated 
by religious or mission-based concerns rather than just profit.221 
Intuitively, it does make sense that forcing a deeply religious in-
dividual who happens to be a commercial speaker in one context 
to convey a message that directly controverts her faith is far 
more burdensome than requiring a restaurant to disclose the ca-
loric content of its foods.222 In essence, by providing courts with 
an avenue to strike down disclosure requirements that may have 
been deemed controversial under the broad “uncontroversial” 
standard in the past—but eliminating the incredibly problem-
atic “purely factual and uncontroversial” standard—this ap-
proach limits the potential damage to commercial disclosure re-
gimes that NIFLA and the “purely factual and uncontroversial” 
standard pose.  
While similar approaches were suggested even prior to NI-
FLA,223 the adoption of this approach is of particular importance 
post-NIFLA.224 As discussed in Part II, the part of Zauderer doc-
trine that NIFLA most directly problematized was the use of the 
“purely factual and uncontroversial” standard, particularly the 
“uncontroversial” prong.225 Generally, the “purely factual and 
 
 217. See, e.g., Brief for the Cato Institute as Amicus Curiae, supra note 189, 
at 6–7 (arguing against the Zauderer majority opinion analysis).  
 218. See Safelite Grp., Inc. v. Jepsen, 764 F.3d 258, 264 (2d Cir. 2014). 
 219. See NIFLA, 138 S. Ct. at 2372. 
 220. See Leading Cases: NIFLA supra note 69, at 354.  
 221. See supra Part II.D. 
 222. See N.Y. State Rest. Ass’n v. N.Y.C. Bd. of Health, No. 08 Civ. 1000 
(RJH), 2008 WL 1752455, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 16, 2008). 
 223. See Repackaging Zauderer, supra note 93, at 989. 
 224. This Note does not pretend to offer the only solution to the problems it 
identifies, or to definitively outline the exact contours of the new, expanded ver-
sion of the “unduly burdensome” test it proposes. Instead, this Note intends to 
serve as the starting point to a debate over how to best shape the law going 
forward.  
 225. See supra Part II. 
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uncontroversial” standard was problematic for three primary 
reasons: (1) the standard was poorly defined and confusing even 
prior to NIFLA; (2) the NIFLA majority’s interpretation of the 
“uncontroversial” prong rendered the standard particularly sus-
ceptible to impermissible judicial bias; and (3) interpreting the 
“uncontroversial” prong to apply to the topic level effectively un-
dermined the consumer protection interests at the heart of all 
commercial speech doctrine.226 This approach significantly miti-
gates, if not removes, all of these problems. 
First, this approach would eliminate the use of the “purely 
factual and uncontroversial” language of Zauderer as a standard 
entirely, which would be hugely beneficial. To begin with, the 
standard and its prongs were developed piecemeal, leading to 
confusing and irregular implementation and definition of the 
test even prior to NIFLA.227 Although there were other jurisdic-
tional differences in interpretations of when and how to apply 
Zauderer deference prior to NIFLA,228 the majority of the differ-
ences focused on the implementation of the standard as a pre-
requisite to Zauderer deference, rather than on what constituted 
an undue burden. In essence, this approach would eliminate the 
confusion of when and how Zauderer deference applies caused 
by the inconsistent and confusing “purely factual and uncontro-
versial” standard.  
Second, this approach would not be plagued by judicial bias 
to the same degree as the NIFLA majority’s approach for several 
reasons. To begin, determining whether a disclosure require-
ment is unduly burdensome is a far narrower determination 
than deciding whether the underlying topic of a disclosure is a 
controversial, which essentially requires two incredibly subjec-
tive determinations: (1) what the underlying topic is; and (2) 
whether the topic chosen is in fact controversial in the eyes of 
the judge.229 By dramatically narrowing the scope of what ques-
tions must be decided by the judge, this approach significantly 
mitigates concerns over judicial bias. In addition, in contrast to 
the “uncontroversial” standard following NIFLA, there is al-
ready existing precedent across other bodies of law that can help 
give indications of what an unduly burdensome requirement 
might look like. For instance, the Supreme Court has used tests 
of undue burden in the context of the dormant commerce clause 
 
 226. See supra Part II. 
 227. See supra Part II.A. 
 228. See supra Part I.C.3.  
 229. See infra Part III.B (noting the similarities between Casey and NIFLA).  
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and access to abortion.230 While the contexts are not identical to 
that of compelled commercial disclosures, the guiding factors 
and general approach to the standard in each are sufficiently 
analogous to give enough guidance to judges to greatly mitigate 
concerns over bias, particularly in comparison to the “uncontro-
versial” standard.231 In conclusion, although room for judicial in-
terpretation and thus bias remains, the dramatic narrowing of 
the scope of the necessary determinations and analogous prece-
dent interpreting similar standards significantly mitigates con-
cerns over judicial bias.  
Finally, this approach is consistent with the consumer pro-
tection interests underlying all commercial speech doctrine, un-
like the “uncontroversial” standard following NIFLA.232 This is 
largely due to the same rationales discussed above in precedent 
implementing the narrower version of the unduly burdensome 
test: a disclosure that is unduly burdensome effectively chills 
speech, and thus runs contrary to consumer interests in infor-
mation.233 In the same way that a mandated disclosure which 
effectively rules out advertisements in a phone book or on busi-
ness cards chills those kinds of speech, it seems reasonable to 
conclude that a disclosure requirement which requires an anti-
abortion activist to share a message on abortion in direct oppo-
sition to his faith or a small-business owner to effectively adver-
tise for her competitors could easily lead either of those parties 
not to speak.234 In addition, because this approach is justifiable 
in serving consumer interests, it does not require the same effec-
tive sublimation of consumer interests to those of commercial 
speakers in not speaking on controversial topics that NIFLA 
seems to require. Indeed, rather than requiring a recognition 
that mission-driven speakers may have a heightened interest in 
non-disclosure, this approach could achieve the same result 
without shifting the focus of and justifications for commercial 
speech doctrine.  
 
 230. See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 579–80 (1995); Planned 
Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 877 (1992).  
 231. See supra Part II.B. 
 232. See supra Part II.C.  
 233. See supra notes 208–10 and accompanying text. 
 234. See supra notes 217–22 and accompanying text.  
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3. Addressing Counterarguments to Expanding the “Unduly 
Burdensome” Test 
There are, however, three primary counterarguments to this 
approach. The first, already largely addressed in this section, ar-
gues that expanding the “unduly burdensome” standard renders 
it subject to the same concerns over judicial bias as the “uncon-
troversial” standard following NIFLA. This Note does not intend 
to suggest that there is any potential expansion of the “unduly 
burdensome” standard which will not, to some degree, make the 
standard more prone to judicial bias than it is as merely a size 
restriction. Instead, this Note argues that this potential increase 
is justified, but also narrower than some might think. First, as 
discussed above, this approach seeks to be a middle ground that 
protects the majority of commercial disclosure requirements by 
granting courts some—albeit significantly narrower—avenues 
to do what they were likely to do anyway. Second, the scope of 
the determinations required (and thus the window for judicial 
bias) is significantly narrower than one might think, and partic-
ularly so in comparison to the “uncontroversial” standard: deter-
mining whether a disclosure is “unduly burdensome” is a signif-
icantly narrower determination than deciding what the 
underlying topic of a disclosure is and then whether that topic is 
controversial.235 In addition, the window is further narrowed 
when one considers this expansion as a mere extension of the 
same rationales as used under the current version of the stand-
ard: a disclosure is unduly burdensome to the extent it will actu-
ally chill speech. Thus, concerns over judicial bias under this ap-
proach are largely overwrought and unwarranted. 
Second, at the end of Part III.A.1, this Note argued that sub-
stituting the current version of the “unduly burdensome” stand-
ard as primarily a size restriction for the “purely factual and un-
controversial” standard already mitigates the problems 
addressed in Part II. If this is truly the case, then why expand 
the standard in a way that could make it harder for disclosure 
requirements to survive in court? This is a tough question to an-
swer, and this Note recognizes the merits of the current ap-
proach. Rather this Note relies on the assumption that there 
may be a different era in First Amendment doctrine right around 
 
 235. The narrowness of the determination matters for one simple reason: it 
limits the scope of potential bias. For instance, imagine being asked to pick a 
color. You have a much greater ability to pick your preferred color in this in-
stance, than when being asked to pick a shade of blue.  
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the corner—one which places greater value on the speaker’s in-
terests in commercial speech and may represent a new Lochner 
era236—and that the best way to protect commercial disclosures 
may be to meet the new trend halfway. Although the current 
state of the “unduly burdensome” standard may be the best for 
commercial disclosures in the short term, if the standard is truly 
to displace the “purely factual and uncontroversial” standard, it 
must grant courts leeway to accomplish some of the things they 
could under the “uncontroversial” standard in order to mitigate 
the temptation to articulate a wholly new standard which is even 
more dangerous to commercial disclosure regimes. 
Finally, the discerning reader by this point may have seized 
upon one hitherto unaddressed argument: how can Zauderer def-
erence truly move on from, and effectively remove the idea that 
a disclosure must be “purely factual and uncontroversial” to re-
ceive Zauderer deference? The answer is simple: this approach 
does not mandate banishing consideration of the phrase from all 
subsequent cases. Instead, this approach recognizes that this 
language from Zauderer is deeply problematic as a standard and 
should thus not be a prerequisite to receiving Zauderer defer-
ence. By replacing the “purely factual and uncontroversial” 
standard with the “unduly burdensome” standard, courts could 
determine whether a disclosure was “unduly burdensome” and 
could then weigh the facts before them and compare those facts 
to the facts in Zauderer, where the disclosure was “purely factual 
and uncontroversial.” In this sense, then, this approach recog-
nizes the “purely factual and uncontroversial” language of Zau-
derer for what it was—a characterization of the facts before the 
Zauderer Court—and would use the phrase merely as grounds 
for a factual comparison between cases.  
* * * 
In sum, although it is highly unlikely that the Court will 
overturn roughly thirty-five years of precedent, replacing the 
“purely factual and uncontroversial” standard with an expanded 
version of the “unduly burdensome” standard mitigates the cur-
rent most problematic aspects of when and how to apply Zau-
derer deference, and would represent a significant upgrade over 
the “purely factual and uncontroversial” test. While this expan-
sion could face problems of its own, particularly concerns over 
the intrusion of judicial bias, the fact that this approach would 
 
 236. See NIFLA, 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2380–83 (2018) (Breyer, J., dissenting); see 
also supra note 216 and accompanying text (explaining that courts are giving 
increasing deference to commercial speakers). 
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at least mitigate, if not also satisfy, all of the concerns raised in 
Part II relatively easily make an expansion of the “unduly bur-
densome” standard as a substitution for the “purely factual and 
uncontroversial” standard the best option for Zauderer deference 
following NIFLA.  
B. ADDRESSING OTHER OPTIONS 
While replacing the “purely factual and uncontroversial” 
standard with some version of the “unduly burdensome” test 
seen in Zauderer is the best approach to fixing Zauderer defer-
ence post-NIFLA, it is certainly not the only one. This Section 
briefly explores two other approaches: limiting what topics are 
controversial and simply ignoring NIFLA. This Section, while ac-
knowledging the merits of these approaches, argues that they do 
not address the problematic aspects of the “purely factual and 
uncontroversial” standard identified in Part II to the same de-
gree as the solution above. 
1. Limiting Which Topics Are Controversial 
 Specifically limiting which topics would be impermissibly 
controversial under NIFLA’s interpretation of how to implement 
the “uncontroversial” prong of Zauderer in future cases is the 
better of the two options raised in this Section. The Court could, 
for instance, limit the application of the underlying topic analy-
sis for the “uncontroversial” prong to the abortion debate, or a 
narrow list of similar topics. This could protect some disclosure 
requirements in less controversial contexts, such as require-
ments to disclose calorie counts at restaurants.237  
However, deciding which topics would qualify would be sub-
ject to the same concerns over judicial bias discussed in Part II.B. 
For instance, NIFLA and Casey were highly similar factually, 
but received markedly different interpretations which were ar-
guably due to their positions on different sides of the abortion 
debate.238 While the risk of bias leading to inconsistent results 
and unequal treatment under the law is particularly notable in 
the abortion context, it could easily extend to other topics. Some 
of this risk could arguably be mitigated by having a specific body, 
 
 237. See NIFLA, 138 S. Ct. at 2380–83 (Breyer, J., dissenting); see also supra 
notes 120, 143 and accompanying text (explaining the majority and minority 
opinions relating to controversiality in NIFLA).  
 238. For a more detailed discussion and background of Casey, see supra note 
119. 
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likely the Supreme Court, establishing one specified set of cate-
gories deemed too controversial rather than determining those 
categories piecemeal by numerous different judges and courts.239  
Despite concerns over bias, the Court has implemented po-
tentially problematic doctrines before and limited them to spe-
cific facts or applications. For example, secondary effects doc-
trine, another part of the Court’s First Amendment 
Jurisprudence,240 permits regulations of speech so long as they 
target the harmful secondary effects of speech, not the speech 
itself.241 While this doctrine has been characterized as problem-
atic, it has survived,242 likely due to the fact that it has primarily 
been implemented in support of zoning restrictions243 on adult-
oriented businesses.244 The Supreme Court’s reticence to imple-
ment secondary effects doctrine outside of the context of adult 
oriented businesses reflects a marked level of judicial restraint 
in limiting a doctrine that many have characterized as problem-
atic and suggests such an approach might be possible following 
NIFLA.245  
However, this approach would still be problematic. First, it 
does not properly recognize consumer protection interests. As 
shown above, consumers have a heightened interest in disclo-
sures of information on controversial topics.246 While limiting 
 
 239. See supra Part II.A.2 (describing the problems arising from piecemeal 
adoption of the “purely factual and uncontroversial” threshold). 
 240. See John Fee, The Pornographic Secondary Effects Doctrine, 60 ALA. L. 
REV. 291, 299–305 (2009) (detailing the development of secondary effects doc-
trine). See generally Daniel R. Aaronson et al., The First Amendment in Chaos: 
How the Law of Secondary Effects Is Applied and Misapplied by the Circuit 
Courts, 63 U. MIAMI L. REV. 741 (2009) (examining the application of secondary 
effects doctrine both by the Supreme Court and at the circuit court level and 
concluding that the state of the doctrine is highly confusing).  
 241. See City of L.A. v. Alameda Books, Inc., 535 U.S. 425, 438 (2002); City 
of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 52 (1986); Young v. Am. Mini 
Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 71 n.34 (1976). 
 242. See Fee, supra note 240, at 293–95; see also Aaronson et al., supra note 
240, at 741, 744 (criticizing secondary effects doctrine as “a mess” suffering from 
“seemingly random development of the law”).  
 243. The doctrine’s foundational cases involve zoning restrictions. See cases 
cited supra note 241.  
 244. The Supreme Court has not, however, explicitly limited the doctrine’s 
application to sexually explicit speakers or adult-oriented businesses. See Fee, 
supra note 240, at 304–05.  
 245. See id. at 293–95.  
 246. See supra Part II.C. 
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the scope of topics covered under the new version of the “uncon-
troversial” prong limits the new test’s damage to some consum-
ers, doing so would do nothing to help consumers harmed by pro-
hibitions on disclosures on whatever topics the Court would 
decide to limit the NIFLA approach to. Second, as much restraint 
as the Supreme Court might show in limiting the scope of a prob-
lematic doctrine, lower courts are often much less reticent to im-
plement that doctrine in different concerning ways.247 Finally, 
this approach continues use of the “purely factual and uncontro-
versial” standard without mitigating or eliminating the confu-
sion that plagued the standard even before NIFLA.248  
In conclusion, limiting the scope of the NIFLA majority’s im-
plementation of the “uncontroversial” prong of the “purely fac-
tual and uncontroversial” test by restricting the topics deemed 
controversial is a viable option. It would, however, be a difficult 
one to implement and still be subject to many of the same con-
cerns raised in Part II.  
2. Ignoring or Rejecting NIFLA 
Finally, the Supreme Court could reject the NIFLA version 
of the Zauderer test and look back to either of the two diverging 
implementations of the standard in cases prior to NIFLA.249 
While the Ninth Circuit’s approach250 would be better at ad-
dressing the problems flagged in Part II, neither does so to the 
same extent as the solution this Note proposes.  
The Ninth Circuit treated the “uncontroversial” prong of the 
“purely factual and uncontroversial” standard as a measure of 
the veracity of the facts in the disclosure requirement.251 Alt-
hough criticized,252 this approach closely mirrors Zauderer’s em-
ployment of the phrase as a singular unit rather than a two-
 
 247. See Aaronson et al., supra note 240, at 743 (noting such a trend in sec-
ondary effects doctrine). 
 248. See supra Part II.A.2.  
 249. See supra notes 169–73 and accompanying text.  
 250. See supra Part II.A.2. 
 251. See, e.g., Am. Beverage Ass’n v. City & County of San Francisco., 871 
F.3d 884, 892–93, 895 (9th Cir. 2017) (finding that a disclosure regarding the 
health risks of sugary beverages was controversial because of the contested ac-
curacy of the facts in the disclosure); CTIA–The Wireless Ass’n v. City of Berke-
ley, 854 F.3d 1105, 1117–18 (9th Cir. 2017) (declaring that “‘uncontroversial’ in 
this context refers to the factual accuracy of the compelled disclosure, not to its 
subjective impact on the audience”). 
 252. See Repackaging Zauderer, supra note 93, at 984 (criticizing this ap-
proach as banal); see also AMI, 760 F.3d 18, 23, 27 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (en banc) 
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pronged test and could mitigate most of the concerns raised in 
Part II.253 First, conflating “uncontroversial” with veracity would 
reduce the confusion surrounding the “purely factual and uncon-
troversial” standard.254 Second, this approach would dramati-
cally reduce the potential for judicial bias because determining 
the factual truth of a disclosure is significantly less subjective 
than determining whether an entire topic is controversial.255 
Third, this approach is consistent with the consumer protection 
interests at the heart of commercial speech doctrine because it 
excels at providing truthful information to consumers, including 
instances where consumers have a heightened interest in that 
information.256  
On the other hand, there are two significant drawbacks. 
First, this approach would significantly lower the bar that com-
mercial disclosure requirements must clear, a move inconsistent 
with the apparent shift in First Amendment doctrine in favor of 
the rights of commercial speakers.257 Rather than taking an ap-
proach of compromise and recognizing this trend (as the solution 
proposed in Part II.A.2 does), this approach would leave courts 
with fewer options to strike down disclosure requirements and 
invite subsequent changes that could be even more subversive to 
commercial disclosure requirements. Second, adoption of this ap-
proach seems somewhat unlikely because a majority of the NI-
FLA Court already apparently subscribed to Justice Thomas’s 
reasoning even prior to the addition of Justice Kavanaugh to the 
bench. 
Courts could also follow the D.C. Circuit in interpreting the 
“uncontroversial” prong of the “purely factual and uncontrover-
 
(implicitly critiquing this approach by concluding that “uncontroversial” must 
mean something different than purely factual). 
 253. Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 651 (1985). 
 254. Id.; see also AMI, 760 F.3d at 34 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring) (“[I]t is 
unclear how [courts] should assess . . . whether a mandatory disclosure is con-
troversial.”). 
 255. For instance, in Casey the Court seemed to accept the state’s arguments 
regarding the potential health risks of abortion, when those arguments have 
been debunked. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 881–87 (1992); 
see also Bryant & Swartz, supra note 104, at 271 (noting that many anti-abor-
tion arguments similar to those risks cited in Casey are not scientifically vali-
dated).  
 256. See supra Part II.C. 
 257. See supra Part III.A.  
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sial” as meaning that something about the message being com-
pelled is controversial.258 However, this approach fails to address 
the lack of clarity surrounding the “purely factual and uncontro-
versial” standard.259 In addition, it only slightly narrows the 
window for judicial bias: determining whether a message is con-
troversial is not that much narrower or less subjective of a de-
termination than determining whether a topic is controver-
sial.260 Finally, this approach is also contrary to consumer 
protection interests for the same reasons identified in Part II 
which drive commercial speech doctrine.  
  CONCLUSION   
Far more than many other bodies of law, Zauderer deference 
and the doctrine surrounding compelled factual disclosures in 
the commercial speech context are highly relevant to consumers. 
Despite the importance of compelled commercial disclosures to 
consumers, NIFLA reinterpreted Zauderer deference—particu-
larly the “uncontroversial” prong of the “purely factual and un-
controversial” standard adopted following Zauderer—in a way 
that this Note has shown to fundamentally jeopardize commer-
cial disclosure regimes. This Note has demonstrated three pri-
mary problems with the “purely factual and uncontroversial 
standard”: (1) the standard is (and has been since its inception) 
unclear and confusing; (2) the standard post-NIFLA subjects 
commercial disclosure requirements to an impermissible poten-
tial for judicial bias; and (3) the standard as implemented in NI-
FLA separates the current doctrine from the consumer protec-
tion interests that it is supposed to serve. Ultimately, this Note 
shows that the best way to address all of these issues—and revi-
talize Zauderer deference as a potent tool that governments can 
rely on in serving consumers—is likely to replace the “purely fac-
tual and uncontroversial” standard with an expanded version of 
the “unduly burdensome” standard. The “unduly burdensome” 
standard is clearer than the “purely factual and uncontroversial” 
standard (aided by precedent interpreting what the standard 
 
 258. See AMI, 760 F.3d at 27.  
 259. See supra notes 171–73 and accompanying text; see also NAM II, 800 
F.3d 518, 528–30 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (implying that disclosures which forced a 
speaker to “confess blood on its hands” or that were the subject of WTO proceed-
ings were controversial); Mass. Ass’n of Private Career Sch. v. Healey, 159 F. 
Supp. 3d 173, 206–07 (D. Mass. 2016) (seeming to suggest that a disclosure is 
“controversial” when the message it conveys would chill speech). 
 260. See supra Part II.B.  
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means in analogous First Amendment contexts), less prone to 
judicial bias because of its narrower scope, and returns Zauderer 
deference to its crucial focus on consumer protection. While not 
the only possible path forward, replacing the “purely factual and 
uncontroversial” standard with an expanded version of the “un-
duly burdensome” standard is preferable to other options—such 
as maintaining the post-NIFLA status quo or returning to one of 
several conflicting pre-NIFLA circuit court interpretations of 
Zauderer—because it addresses, if not remedies, all of the most 
deeply problematic aspects of the NIFLA majority’s interpreta-
tion of Zauderer. 
